

Summary on the  
**Research Project Report**

**"20 Years of Federal Police in Austria – 2005-2025"**

**From the Merger of the Police Forces  
Federal Gendarmerie, Federal Security Police and Criminal Investigators Corps  
until Today (2005-2025)**

**Project Manager:** Police Colonel Dr. Bernd Bürger, M. A., M. A.

**Deputy:** Vice-President (retd.) Gerd Thielmann, M. A. (equ.)

Research Associates (alphabetical order):

Dr. Jule Adriaans, M. A., B. A.

Police Captain Andreas Gierl, M. A.

Stefanie Giljohann, graduate Psychologist

Vice President of the Hessian Criminal Police Office Rudi Heimann, M. A. (equ.), graduate in public administration

Tamara Jäger, M. Sc., B. A.

Phillip Marsell, B. A.

Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Friedhelm Nachreiner, graduate Psychologist

CEPOL Executive Director (retd.) Dr. Dr. h. c. Detlef Schröder, M. A., M. A. (equ.),

Dr. Catharina Vogt (Decker), graduate Psychologist

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**Notes:**

This is the short version of a research report in German language with almost 600 pages. All sources can be found in the original report.

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## 1. Introduction

The merger of the three police forces – the Federal Gendarmerie Corps, the Federal Security Police Corps and the Criminal Investigators Corps – in the year 2005 was one of the most complex police reforms in Europe in the 21st century (hereinafter referred to as "Reform 2005"). Over 27,000 employees from three very different organisations were merged to form a new federal police force. A standardised organisation was created, whereby hierarchy, management structures, business processes and working methods, including equipment and technical systems, were adapted to the new structure. And these far-reaching changes of this scope and scale were implemented within a project period of two and a half years, during which over 1,600 work packages had to be completed. This was followed by a second reform step in 2012, in which the previous Public Security Directorates, Regional Police Commands and Federal Police Directorates, a total of 31 authorities, were transformed into nine Regional Police Directorates in the federal states (hereinafter referred to as "Reform 2012").

## 2. Research Assignment

In January 2024, the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior awarded the German Society for Industrial, Economic and Organisational Psychological Research (GAWO e. V.) a research contract for the project "20 years of the Federal Police - from the merger of the Federal Gendarmerie, Federal Security Police and Criminal Investigators Corps to the present day (2005-2025)".

### 2.1. Research Questions

The research questions posed by the Ministry of the Interior can be summarised as follows:

- What were the historical and legal reasons for the reforms?
- What were the goals, were they achieved and what were the advantages and disadvantages?
- How have the change management process been carried out?
- What changes have occurred over the two decades?
- Can data and statistics be used to illustrate the effects of the reforms?
- What are the current challenges facing the Federal Police?

### 2.2. Research Team

To answer these questions, GAWO e. V. put together an eleven-person, intergenerational research team. It consisted of experienced police officers with scientific expertise as well as social science researchers with proven experience in police research:

- **Project Manager:** Police Colonel Dr. Bernd Bürger, M. A., M. A., Bavarian Police Training Institute
- **Deputy:** Vice President Gerd Thielmann (retd.), M. A. (equ.), formerly German Police University
- Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Friedhelm Nachreiner, graduate Psychologist, board member of the Society for Industrial, Economic and Organisational Psychological Research
- Dr. Dr. h. c. Detlef Schröder, M. A., M. A. (equ.), Executive Director of the EU Agency CEPOL (retd.).
- Dr. Jule Adriaans, M. A., B. A., Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University

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- Dr. Catharina Vogt (née Decker), graduate Psychologist, German Police University
  - Vice President Rudi Heimann, M. A. (equ.), Hessian Criminal Police Office
  - Stefanie Giljohann, graduate Psychologist, Berlin University of Technology
  - Tamara Jäger, M. Sc., B. A. Coburg University of Applied Sciences
  - Police Captain Andreas Gierl, M. A., Frankfurt am Main Police Headquarters, Internal Audit
  - Phillip Marsell, B. A., Managing Partner at "Limoment GmbH" and trainer for leadership and communication at the German Police University

### **2.3. Methods**

Both qualitative and quantitative methods were chosen to answer the research questions to ensure the most comprehensive analysis of the reform processes examined. The use of mixed methods made it possible to combine different perspectives and validate the results through triangulation.

The analysis of historical and organisational documents laid the foundation for an in-depth understanding of the reform processes. Qualitative interviews provided additional, subjective insights, which were further condensed through systematic coding and evaluation. These perspectives were complemented by the quantitative analysis of security-related statistics and surveys to capture both objective developments and subjective perceptions.

Three central periods were defined for the structural and methodological approach:

- The first reform phase (from 2003),
- the second reform phase (from 2012) and
- the current situation (2024).

Overall, this methodological approach pursued the goals of holistically mapping the complexity of the reform processes, answering the research questions and at the same time deriving practice-oriented recommendations for action.

### **2.4. Theoretical Basics**

To ensure a broad theoretical foundation for answering the research questions, the theoretic foundations regarding change management in administration and more focussed on the police were first evaluated. In addition, the experiences of police reforms in Europe reported in the literature were evaluated. From this, an audit scheme of success factors was derived to compare the reforms in Austria (see 6).

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### 3. Literature and Document Analysis

Research resources of the literature and document analysis were:

- Politics and parliament (government programs, National Parliament, laws)
- Governmental authorities and agencies (Court of Audit, Ministry of the Interior documents, Ministry of the Interior publications)
- Public media and science (print and online media, scientific papers and publications)
- Police unions and professional associations (publications)

Documents from the staff representatives (central committees) could not be evaluated for legal (protection of staff representatives) as well as factual reasons (no more files available).

#### 3.1. Key Findings of the 2005 Reform

The following reform objectives for the 2005 reform were identified:

1. Creation of a standardised organisational and operational structure
2. Increasing the effectiveness of policing
3. Best possible international compatibility of the police force
4. Flattening of the hierarchy levels
5. Avoidance of parallel structures
6. Acceleration and simplification of processes
7. Increased police presence in the public
8. Further increase in road safety
9. Delegation of responsibility to subordinate departments
10. Streamlining administrative processes
11. Increasing effectiveness and efficiency
12. Highest possible employee satisfaction
13. Social compatibility
14. Standardised initial and advanced training
15. Orientation towards best practice models
16. Standardisation and modernisation of technical management tools
17. Uniform corporate design

The government program of 2003 was the starting point for the 2005 reform and defined the goal of merging the three police forces. In previous years, similar attempts were politically blocked, although some smaller measures to improve cooperation between the police forces were implemented.

The political constellation (ÖVP-FPÖ coalition) opened a window of opportunity for a comprehensive reform. The corresponding laws were initiated and passed in the National Parliament. In doing so, politicians also followed the recommendations of the Austrian Court of Audit, which had already proposed such a merger several times.

Documents from the Federal Ministry of the Interior show that a project group headed by Franz Lang was purposefully set up. A discussion paper of more than one hundred and forty pages was drawn up and discussed with employees throughout the country on information tours by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Strasser (together with the project manager). Numerous other communication channels were also used, such as publications in the Ministry of the Interior magazine "ÖFFENTLICHE SICHERHEIT". Employees were also able to contact the project team directly with suggestions. This was followed by a master plan on project

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management and an implementation plan with follow-up steps, and the described steps there were gradually implemented

The public media were only analysed by way of example rather than comprehensively. They reported critically or less critically on the reform depending on their political positions. Some academic studies examined the implementation of the reform and its results. In general, their assessments favoured the reform.

The police unions and their political groups initially took different positions, depending on their political position. The FSG (social democratic group) were strictly against the reform. The FCG (Christian group) was cautiously in favour. The FEG/AUF union (close to the FPÖ nationalist) for a merger, but with the retention of the Gendarmerie (integration of the other police forces). The VKÖ, the organisation representing the interests of criminal investigators, was firmly against the reform. The Ministry of the Interior was able to push through the reform steps in the central committees. Only a planned new duty time system, abbreviated to DZS04, was vehemently rejected by all trade unions and ultimately stopped.

The three police forces, including the staff taken over from the Customs Guard, were formed into the new federal police force. This was done with a new corporate design and uniform work processes, mostly adopted from the Gendarmerie, although these were new for the police (Federal Security Police and Criminal Investigators Corps). A reform of the structure of the Public Security Directorates, Regional Police Commands and Federal Police Directorates was not implemented, as this was a political requirement, and no police stations were closed.

As around 10 % of management positions were eliminated due to a streamlining of the organisational structure, a salary retention period of 100 % over six years was set up for those affected as social cushioning. During this time, some officers reached retirement, while others were reassigned to management positions that had become vacant.

### **3.2. Key Findings of the 2012 Reform**

The following main objectives were identified for the 2012 reform:

- Merger of the eight Public Security Directorates (*Sicherheitsdirektion = SID*), fourteen Federal Police Directorates (*Bundespolizeidirektion = BPD*) and nine Regional Police Commands (*Landespolizeikommando = LPK*) in the federal states into nine Regional Police Directorates (*Landespolizeidirektion = LPD*)
- Finalization of the 2005 reform
- Other objectives were of a legislative nature (legal definition of the Federal Police Force, regulations on district administrative authorities and security authorities of the first instance).

The 2012 reform was the second "window of opportunity", as the required 2/3 majority for an amendment to the Federal Constitution was achieved at a political level. The constitution was amended, and the corresponding laws were passed.

A project group at the Ministry of the Interior was tasked with implementing the reform. The nine Regional Police Directorates were established at state level. The previous heads of the three organisational units were each appointed as head and two deputies for the new LPDs in a Board of Directors-model. The Ministry of the Interior managed to keep this project internal until shortly before its implementation, and the media, as well as the police unions, were

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correspondingly surprised. However, as only the top management level was affected by this project, reactions ranged from cautious to approving.

### **3.3. Key Findings on the Current Challenges**

The following topics emerged as the current challenges:

- Migration and illegal immigration
- Cybercrime and other digital challenges
- Organised crime and clan crime
- Internationalization
- Reform of the Criminal Investigation Department
- Development of Federal Police personnel
- Further training

## **4. Interview Study**

This area of qualitative research comprised a total of 26 semi-structured, approximately one-hour interviews with people from the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Police who were involved in the reform processes in various ways. Participation was voluntary, and the results were anonymised. In addition, the Federal Chancellor in office at the time of the 2005 reform, Dr. Wolfgang Schäussel, was interviewed. Nine further interviews from secondary sources from the period between 2004 and 2005 (3 ministers, former Director General of Public Police and Head of Team 04) were also analysed.

### **4.1. Key Findings of the 2005 Reform**

Regarding the category "Achievement of objectives of the 2005 reform", a complex picture emerged. The achievement of objectives was

- **rated with strong positive or positive evidence:**
  - Education and training (standardised and improved training measures)
  - International compatibility
  - Uniform corporate design
  - Orientation towards best practice models
  - Creation of a standardised organisational and operational structure
  - Social compatibility of the reform
  - Standardization and modernization of technical management tools
  - Increasing effectiveness and efficiency
- **rated with moderate positive or moderate evidence:**
  - Acceleration and simplification of processes
  - Delegation of responsibility to subordinate departments
  - Increasing the effectiveness of policing
  - Streamlining administrative processes
  - Avoidance of parallel structures
  - Increasing road safety
- **ambivalent assessment**
  - Increase in police presence in the public
  - Employee satisfaction with an interesting development: strong evidence of initial deterioration followed by long-term improvement

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- **rated as weak:**
    - Flattening of the hierarchy levels

The following reasons were given in the category "Reasons for the 2005 reform":

- Increasing efficiency and reducing costs
- Political motivation
- Structural problems
- Inconsistent standards
- Changes in Europe

In the categories "Historical background/earlier reform attempts", "Challenges during the implementation of the 2005 reform" and "Obstacles", the following key statements were made:

- **Historical background of the guard bodies:**  
Strong awareness of the more than century-old traditions and cultures of the guard bodies.
- **Earlier attempts at reform:**  
Numerous attempts to reform since the 1960s have failed due to resistance from staff representatives and a lack of political will to implement reforms; only minor reform steps to bring the guard bodies closer together have been implemented.
- **Cultural differences:**  
Here it became clear that there were serious differences in the organisational cultures of the guard bodies due to different histories, structures and working methods. These were reinforced by conditioned competitive thinking. The perceived dominance of the Gendarmerie in the reform, the feared changes in the Criminal Investigation Department (Criminal Investigators Corps) and the forced abandonment of the old cultures were a particular challenge for the merger.
- **Duty time system:**  
A vehement rejection of the new DZS04 prevented the introduction of a new, modern duty time system at this time.
- **Authority structure:**  
The 2005 reform did not change the characteristic separation between the public security authority on the one hand and the guards/executive body on the other, and consequently more complex bureaucratic responsibilities and processes remained in place.
- **Changes to the local distribution of police stations:**  
A change in the local distribution of police stations was not initiated for political reasons.
- **Shift in responsibilities:**  
It was recognised that areas of tension would arise due to the changes of competencies of police lawyers versus executive officers, nevertheless the strengthening of the executive was pushed forward.
- **Uniform:**  
Initially, there was a minor setback with a first unsuccessful design attempt, after which the uniform design that is still in use today was successfully introduced.

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- **Process design:**  
The previous analogue business processes were programmed into the new digital infrastructure; it may have made sense to adapt the processes at that time, but this would have required additional capacity.
  - **Resignation of the Minister of the Interior:**  
Minister Strasser resigned shortly before the project was implemented. However, the successor(s) remained consistently on course for reform, so that the risk that the reform would be stopped did not materialise.
  - **Resistance and fears:**  
Resistance came from the police unions, staff representatives and some managers. In particular, there were fears regarding the loss of management functions or staff representative positions, prestige, and income.
  - **Influence of the gendarmerie:**  
Members of the Federal Security Police guards and the Criminal Investigators Corps feared that the Gendarmerie would have too much influence in the reform process and on the results
  - **Political discourse:**  
The political discourse took place on three levels: At the federal level, the pros, and cons were discussed by the political parties. At state level, the state representatives feared for their influence and at municipal level, the mayors feared the closure of police stations, which, however, did not happen.

The following findings emerged regarding the "change management process" category:

- **Organisational culture:**  
It was acknowledged that too little emphasis was placed on a deliberate process of merging the different organisational cultures, leading to resistance and dissatisfaction.
- **Involvement of employees:**  
Numerous employees were directly involved in the project and numerous information events were held. In addition to the official channels, suggestions could also be made directly to the project team.
- **Information and communication:**  
The information and communication strategy and the individual measures are described by the majority of interviewees - with a few critical voices - as good.
- **Planning and control:**  
The large scale of the project was handled by professional project management. External consultants were not involved as there was sufficient expertise within the organisation.
- **Evaluation:**  
A previously scheduled and comprehensive evaluation was dispensed with.

The results of the category "Reform results 2005" show an overall positive balance. Thus

- the reform itself,
- the reduction of internal rivalries,
- the external impact/communication,
- nationwide cooperation and deployability

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- the creation of standardised training and standards,
  - increasing efficiency and
  - about the gained clear structures and responsibilities

were rated positively.

When the approach of training and deploying police officers as generalists (vs. specialists) was promoted, it became clear that this approach was and is not fully accepted and that in certain areas (e.g. cybercrime) the focus is returned to specialization.

As expected, there were teething problems at the beginning of the implementation of the reform about work processes, but these were overcome over time. The same applies to the working atmosphere, which temporarily deteriorated due to the changeover with the new processes and, in the case of some managers, due to the loss of their role and the perceived disregard for identity and culture. The lack of inculturation in particular was still an issue for some older interviewees.

#### 4.2. Key Findings of the 2012 Reform

With regard to the category "Achievement of objectives of the 2012 reform", the results were clearer:

- **Challenges:**  
These were fewer challenges than in 2005, as there was cross-party consensus, and only upper management was affected.
- **Change management process:**  
Communication and implementation were not so challenging, as the group of people involved was manageable.
- **Increasing efficiency and reducing costs:**  
The 31 authorities became nine Regional Police Directorates. Both were evident.
- **Solving structural problems:**  
The demarcation of responsibilities and competencies between the three organisational authorities is obsolete, as there is now only one authority with one person at the top who has overall responsibility.
- **Political motivation:**  
At federal level, there was the required majority in the parliament for the necessary constitutional amendments and the subsequent legislative procedures
- **Completion of the 2005 reform:**  
The new authority structure was the last and consistent step towards achieving a consistent hierarchical structure of the Federal Police, which was not possible for political reasons in 2005.
- **Disadvantages of the reform:**  
Social compatibility was seen as a disadvantage, although it went in favour of managers (no loss of salary, new management function), but against efficiency (no cost reduction, still too many management positions). In addition, the somewhat misleading name of *Landespolizeidirektion* – in the literal translation "State Police Directorate" – was criticised, as it is actually more of a "Federal Police Directorate" in the state (*Bundespolizeidirektion*).

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- **Advantages of the reform:**

The advantages of the reform clearly outweigh the disadvantages. There is now a consistent pyramid of responsibility and uniform basic structures in all federal states. Accordingly, resources can be managed efficiently, and communication and decision-making channels are clear.

The interviewees reported the following aspects in the "**Current challenges**" category:

- Effects of international conflicts (increasing, crisis management must be strengthened)
- Bureaucracy (excessive, must be reduced)
- Cybercrime and digitalization (specialization, strengthening of basic and advanced training)
- Working time system (still not an up-to-date system)
- Extremism and terrorism (increasingly complex)
- Leadership culture (adaptation to new conditions necessary)
- Generational conflict (different views on work-life-balance)
- Social changes (external and internal, see generational conflict)
- Level of violence in society (increasing)
- Migration (overburdening of society)
- Employee retention (new forms necessary, as new generation)
- Public Relations (new forms needed, new media)
- Organised crime (increasing danger due to interconnectedness)
- Political influence (e.g. too strong when filling management positions)
- Legal framework (increasingly complex)
- Recruitment (competition for young talent)
- Resilience of critical infrastructures (increasing threats)
- Overburdening of police (too many operations, constantly new tasks and enormous bureaucratic effort with too few personnel)
- Change as a constant (understanding constant change as the norm)
- Further optimization of basic and advanced training (new content, new forms)

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## 5. Evaluation of secondary data

The following quantitative secondary data was analysed:

- Statistics on crime
- Statistics on road safety
- Surveys on trust in the police
- Surveys on the feeling of safety
- Personnel data of the Federal Police
- Statistics on government spending
- Results of past employee surveys

The secondary data analyses yielded the following results:

- **Crime trends (reported crime statistics):** Continuous decline in the number of cases over the entire observation period (although the opposite trend in the last two years) and a steady increase in the crime clearance rates.
- **Road safety:** The number of road deaths fell sharply, while the number of registered vehicles increased massively.

The two aforementioned positive developments are similar in neighbouring countries or even throughout the EU.

- Trust in the police and the **feeling of security** in Austria are high. The trust is directly attributable to the police and their work, the feeling of security only partially.
- Due to a lack of data, it was not possible to determine the **police field presence** in a valid manner. Control and patrol activities, which have only been recorded since 2012, have remained at a similar level, albeit with a downward trend.
- The **number of staff** has increased by three percent in the period under review, and the ratio of executive to administrative officers has shifted in favour of executive officers.
- In terms of **government expenditure**, there was an inflation-adjusted increase in expenditure for the Federal Police from 2,131 (nominally 1,664) million Euros in 2002 to 2,498 (nominally 3,258) million Euros by 2023. This corresponds to an increase of 17.2 percent (95.8 percent in nominal terms) - in comparison, the Bavarian police recorded an increase of 22.1 percent in the same period.
- In terms of external conditions, the statistics show a sharp increase in **migration** with a positive migration balance. The number of asylum applications has risen sharply, especially since the war in Ukraine
- In an evaluation of various **employee surveys of members** of the former police forces and the Federal Police from the observation period, no valid conclusions could be drawn from the accessible secondary sources (mostly due to a lack of scientific standards) about the fulfilment of the reform objectives or the effects of the reforms.

The entire secondary data analyses were subject to the difficulties of an ex-post evaluation, i.e. all data had been collected for other purposes and essential data was missing. **A correlation of the developments with the reforms cannot be proven.**

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## 6. Alignment of Change Management Theory with the Reform Process

The comparison of the developed audit scheme was limited to the 2005 reform, as this was one of the largest reforms in Europe to date. The research group came to the following assessments:

1. **Clear objectives:**

Strategic objectives were available, but these should have been operationalised by specifying target achievement levels and reference values. The operational objectives of Team 04 in project management were professionally designed.

2. **Honesty in communicating the project goals:**

During the reform, communication was very active, transparent, and honest, using various methods available at the time of the reform.

3. **Consideration of the context and organisational culture:**

Too little emphasis was placed on dealing with organisational cultures. A planned process of inculturation did not take place. This could have been a risk factor for the success of the reform in 2005 that should not be underestimated. But the reform did not fail because of this; a new organisational culture developed over time.

4. **Balance between centralization and local adaptation:**

Regarding local police stations, a decision was made between centrality (closing police stations to gain synergies) and locality (not closing police stations due to proximity to citizens and a sense of security) in favour of leaving the structure as it is.

About the generalist approach, which was stringently pursued at the beginning, specialization is now being pushed again in some areas, such as cybercrime.

5. **Clear commitment from those in charge**

The constellation of players was a decisive success factor. On the one hand, there was the assertive and resilient Minister of the Interior, his stringent successors and a supportive Federal Chancellor. Secondly, a committed project manager – who was recognised throughout Austria as an experienced operations manager – with a hand-picked and professional planning team

6. **Identification of managers with the project**

Whether and to what extent managers at lower hierarchical levels were convinced of the necessity of the reform and showed commitment to it could not be proven. The very generous salary retention provisions, which were not only very generous in terms of time, are likely to have at least minimised resistance.

7. **Involvement and acceptance of the stakeholders**

Political leadership, managers, and employees were extensively involved in the reform project. The staff representative bodies (central committees) could not be won over as supporters. The regional governors were won over to the reform through intensive communication and concessions regarding their involvement in the appointment of managers.

8. **Realistic time frame**

The timeframe of around 2.5 years for a reform of this magnitude seems both as long as necessary and as short as possible. A longer period would have reduced the pressure to act and given time for protracted resistance within the organisation and at a political level. It could hardly have been much shorter, as both the internal organisational implementation steps and the necessary legislative procedures required a certain amount of time.

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## 9. Sufficient resources

There were no indications that the financial resources would have been a problem and were therefore sufficient. In retrospect, the human resources appear to be sufficient and professionally qualified. The consultation and involvement of scientific expertise was ensured by the inclusion of academically trained staff and appears sufficient.

## 10. Gradual implementation and flexibility

The 2005 reform in Austria were – in accordance with a model from the literature – an "earthquake", i.e. it was introduced swiftly and sustainably, and it was not a "boomerang", i.e. a return to the (approximate) initial state after an abrupt change.

## 11. Training measures

The training measures for the staff involved in the project were professionally organised.

Training for employees regarding new processes etc. appears to have required optimization.

## 12. Systematic evaluation and adaptation:

There was no systematic evaluation of the reform objectives and outcomes after the 2005 reform. There was an international recognition award for the reform, a positive evaluation by a master's thesis and parliamentary scrutiny.

The overall result of the comparison with the theory-based and experience-based success factors is that the 2005 reform was implemented professionally – with slight limitations – and was therefore successful. It should be emphasised that the benchmarks were derived from current literature and that the reform 20 years ago already met these current requirements

## 7. Conclusion

The 2005 reform was an extraordinarily challenging task. Until then, the police (Federal Security Police and Criminal Investigators Corps) and the Federal Gendarmerie were separated in terms of organisation, personnel, communication, and technology and were even managed separately at the ministry level. Even minor cross-district crimes could cause coordination difficulties.

A standardised organisation under the name *Bundespolizei* (Federal Police) and a new corporate identity therefore brought considerable advantages as well as efficiency gains, and is also clearly positive in terms of security policy.

The reform of the authorities in 2012 consequently merged the Public Security Directorates, the Federal Police Directorates and the Regional Police Commands into the nine Regional Police Directorates, which are subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

The following **possibilities for optimizing** the reform process were identified:

- Formulations of project objectives in need of improvement (especially strategic targets)
- Missing process of enculturation (consideration of previous cultures)
- Avoidance or minimization of conflict between lawyers and executive officials (anticipatory measures to avoid power struggles)
- No development of new processes (existing processes were transferred to the new IT infrastructure)

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- No up-to-date duty time management (DSZ 04 stopped, no intervention one to date)
  - Unbalanced generalist vs. specialist approach (initially too strongly focused on generalists)

**Aspects** of the reform **worthy of imitation** were:

- Rapid implementation of the reform ("window of opportunity" used)
- Social compatibility (generous salary guarantees)
- Employee participation (very good under the conditions at the time)
- No need for external consulting (because the organisation has internal, qualified expertise)
- Composition of the core project team: As project manager, an experienced executive (operational experience with making far-reaching decisions under time pressure) who was recognised nationwide (expected positive credibility effects) and he was allowed to put together a team as project manager.
- Sustained and ongoing political support (the Ministers and the Chancellor)
- Consistently implemented the necessary follow-up reform (second "window of opportunity" used)

The current **structure of the Federal Police** is as follows:

- The Federal Minister of the Interior is the highest service authority.
- Within the Minister of Interior, the section II, the Directorate-General for Public Security (GDfDöS), bears overall responsibility for all matters relating to the security forces in Austria and currently has around 32,000 police officers and around 3,800 security administration officers at its disposal.
- At the federal level, the central organisational units of the GDfDöS are the Federal Police Directorate (BPD) and the Directorate for Organisation, Resources and Crisis Management (ORK), as well as the Federal Criminal Police Office (BK), the Directorate for State Protection and Intelligence Services (DSN), and the Directorate of Special Units / S.W.A.T. Cobra (DSE/EKO Cobra).
- The Security Academy (SIK) is the central educational and research institution of the BMI.
- There are nine Regional Police Directorate in the federal states. These are responsible for:
- Police Inspectorates (for matters concerning the Immigration Police and Police Medical Service, as well as the traffic and criminal records offices, school transport cards, certificates of good conduct, explosive purchase orders, etc.)
- District Police Headquarters and City Police Headquarters.
- Police Stations (Law and Traffic Enforcement and Criminal Investigation Service).
- Specialised Police Units such as Traffic Police, Border Police or Service Dog Inspectorates.

In short, the existing model is best suited for Austria because it has the following characteristics:

- There is a standardised federal police force with the same name and appearance all over the state, as well as the same structure (with adjustments in Vienna), which covers all police matters.

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- The Federal Police provides law and traffic enforcement as well as criminal police services throughout Austria.
  - The special needs of the organisation for Vienna have been considered.
  - There is one Regional Police Directorate per federal state.
  - Funding from a single source is guaranteed by the federal budget.
  - There is one main generalist approach that is recommended for many decentralised departments.
  - Specialisation is being pushed again, especially for criminal police tasks including cybercrime.
  - There are functional and effective central offices at federal level (BK, DSN, DSE, SIAK).
  - Such a centrally structured police organisation can react more quickly to changes in the environment than a federal system.
  - Good international compatibility is ensured by central contacts, local cross-border co-operation and centrally managed strategic international cooperation.