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Error Management Culture in the Police Force

The effect of organisational structure and masculinity constructions on dealing with mistakes

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A large part of police activity takes place visibly in public spaces and is affected by different dynamics that can be influenced only to some extent in approaches. In this context, the relationship of the police organisation to the occurrence of mistakes may come as a surprise, but it is mostly clear within the organisation: mistakes do not happen! It quickly becomes clear that this attitude cannot contribute to identifying the value and opportunities of using mistakes profitably, to preventing mistakes or to learning from mistakes systematically. However, it is questionable why it appears noticeable that mistakes are approached in such a negative manner within the police. In order to approach this question, the structural level of the organisation and the individual level of the persons involved will be taken into account. In particular, the influence of the masculinity models of police culture on how to deal with mistakes clearly shows how approaching mistakes in a negative way is (re)produced by the relationship between structure and action.

1. INTRODUCTION

The work of the police must be understood as practice in a high-dimensional environment in which a wide variety of interest groups are directly or indirectly affected to varying degrees by the activities of police officers. Those widely affected, as reflected, for example, in the dimension of the citizen as the "police counterpart", in the observing public or in the organisational and political dimension, place high demands on the occupational competences of the police officers involved. Policing occurs in complex and multi-layered areas of activity involving dynamic demands. Police officers are often required to make quick, clear decisions and act decisively (Mihalic 2017, 11). In this context, the occurrence of mistakes should not lead to great astonishment, but should rather be understood as normality, since a probability of a human error of 25 % must be assumed, especially for activities involving a high level of stress (cf. Thomeczek/Ollenschläger 2005, 43). In other words: "Where there are people, mistakes are made" (Haselow/Schümchen 2004, 269).

In spite of an analysis of police research on the error management culture of the police, which is currently taking place and will hopefully continue to deepen in the future (cf. e.g., Karis 2019; Daniel 2018; Jasch 2017; Seidensticker 2016; Feltes 2012a; Liebl 2004), there have been few or no changes within the organisational police culture. Error management culture in the police has almost exclusively been addressed outside the police and has not been included in internal organisational change processes in this context. The first

steps were made in 2016 at the conference of the German Police University on the subject of "Error management culture in the police force" and it remains to be hoped that this range of topics will be included in police management training. Looking at the module handbook of the Bachelor's programme at the University of Applied Sciences for Public Administration and Management in North Rhine-Westphalia, it becomes clear that error management culture is not yet an explicit issue when it comes to entering a career in the police force (cf. Seidensticker 2019).

The dynamic development of society demands a climate for innovation within the organisation in order to cope with demands that are increasing and constantly changing. Innovation implies the attempt to solve a problem, which also includes mistakes or failure. Failure in particular is an important aspect of an innovation climate and a component of learning organisations. If the police want to understand themselves as such and orient themselves according to this concept, they need a no-blame culture which enables learning from mistakes.

This article takes up the initial findings of an ongoing dissertation project within the framework of a DFG[1] project on the "readjustment of masculinities", in which masculinity models in different organisational units and their reproduction are the focus at the level of action and structure.

2. THE CONCEPT OF MISTAKE

What a mistake is depends on what was done (or was not done) in a particular situation, what alternatives there were to that decision, who evaluates that decision and in which context. A mistake can be described as a decision made by a subject after weighing existing alternatives in an interactional or procedural context and which results in an unintended deviation from a norm that is applicable to the respective reference system, which is evaluated ex post as undesirable by a (not necessarily different) subject (cf. Seidensticker 2016, 16). The authority to interpret therefore does not always lie with the person involved, which can sometimes lead to different evaluations of the same action by different persons. Mistakes are therefore initially to be understood as the results of relative and subjective valuation models and do not necessarily have to be perceived as such by the persons making the mistakes in the respective situation, since they initially classify their actions as correct (cf. Karis 2019, 97). This can be assumed, in particular, if the behaviour in question is in accordance with the norms and values of the police culture applicable in the respective context.

3. WHAT INFLUENCES THE HANDLING OF MISTAKES IN THE POLICE?

Mistakes and misconduct do not occur regularly because a boundary is deliberately overstepped, but are rather due to the specific circumstances of the respective situation. Misjudgements and the resulting misconduct do not happen in a vacuum, but are always the result of an individual learning process involving the persons in the field. This learning process often begins as soon as a person enters the field and has experienced how officers deal with overstepping a boundary (Mihalic 2017, 11). The following section discusses selected factors that have an influence on the level of error management culture within the police.

3.1 Public focus on policing

If we consider the area of responsibility of police officers and consider the variety of dynamically developing and changing problem situations with which they have to deal in a mostly publicly visible way

(cf. Jasch 2017, 100), it becomes clear that the occurrence of mistakes in this context cannot be uncommon. It is certainly not possible to regard a mistake occurring in the police's approaches for resolving actions and conflicts as an exception to an otherwise flawless system. The fact that a mistake occurs in the course of these activities appears to be much more realistic than the impression of a generally flawless act. It is precisely the increased visibility of police operations – the "new visibility" (Goldsmith 2010; Thompson 2005) – due to new recording and dissemination techniques by the observing citizens that leads to an increased public perception of mistakes and creates great pressure on the police officers involved. If policing is based on a no-blame culture, deliberate handling of this phenomenon may strengthen the personal and professional skills of police officers. A negative blame culture, on the other hand, promotes strategies of covering up and concealing mistakes, which can lead to fear of sanctions and to tendencies towards compartmentalisation (cf. Seidensticker 2019).

There are indications that mistakes accompany police officers every day and should therefore be perceived and treated as such. In this connection, a paradox seems to be the internal police view that no mistakes "should occur" (Feltes 2012a, 290) and therefore would not actually happen. In this self-perception and public image, the refusal to deal with the possibility of structural and cultural causes of mistakes and misconduct in the organisation implicitly resonates (cf. Jasch 2017, 100). This is regularly reflected, among other things, in statements made by police interest groups, which are often critical of analysing and disclosing mistakes and generally flatly reject, for example, the introduction of independent supervisory bodies or a requirement for police officers to be labelled. It is now in the nature of interest groups to first represent the interests of their members or the professional group. However, the persistent arguments with fears, such as an increase in mistrust of the police or a generated general suspicion (cf. Ullrich 2019, 180), appear less constructive and not tenable. Experiences from the implementation of projects in complex and difficult to understand fields of work (such as the police) indicate that a high degree of transparency and verifiability is a critical success factor and can also generate commitment (cf. Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen 2018). The open approach to handling mistakes and misconduct does not contribute to an increase in mistrust, but rather to an increase in trust in the police because it rejects deliberate misconduct in a discernible manner (cf. Karis 2019, 99). In addition, such an approach also supports the self-perception and self-efficacy of police officers who behave in compliance with the rules and it even protects them from general suspicion.

3.2 Structural level of the organisation

In its self-image and in the public eye, the police is a special form of organisation. Their duty to maintain public safety and order means that their actions are sometimes carried out in potentially dangerous situations. Because of this need to deal with danger, the police are allowed, within the limits of proportionality, to resort to violence as the last legitimate means of fulfilling their duties. The historical aftermath of a state police orientation with an overemphasised culture of masculinity and a strong sense of ownership and status still characterises the culture of individual organisational units.

3.2.1 High level of regulation and strict responsibilities

The hierarchically lower level of the organi-

sation with its bureaucratic regimentation leads to a multitude of communication barriers which are detrimental to a constructive approach to mistakes and their learning potential. While mistakes are more likely to be addressed in open discourse within teams, there are often reservations about communicating mistakes upwards or downwards. Responsibilities are strictly regulated in the line organisation and framed by a rigid construct of obligations and controls. In this context, the close ties of the police to policy and the influence exerted by policy have a suppressive effect. Mistakes may have far-reaching political consequences and they may jeopardise careers. In this sense, the organisation endeavours to meet the implied expectations of a flawless police force: mistakes are dealt with or not dealt with internally with anticipatory obedience before they become public and thus politically charged (cf. Seidensticker 2019). This tendency can be observed in the police, especially after public debates about known mistakes, such as the recent police scandal in the Lügde case in North Rhine-Westphalia[2]. A no-blame culture is not experienced at the interface between politics and the police and cannot be used as a model for an internal error culture within an organisation, which contributes to further impeding organisational learning from mistakes.

In the context of a constructive no-blame culture, the high level of regulation in the police force presents itself as dysfunctional and can even contribute to an increased occurrence of mistakes. This is triggered in particular by the paradox of police work: On the one hand, overregulation leads police officers to perceive their activity as relatively unattractive and this develops technocratically into mere routine work (cf. Haselow/Schümchen 2004, 280 ff). On the other hand, the attempt to regulate police practice through a multitude of directives and regulations is not suitable for comprehensively grasping the tangible reality of policing (especially in the day-to-day handling of citizens' problems). Police officers often find that police practice sometimes demands more than police work according to the manual: situations develop dynamically and are often perceived as issues that cannot be handled using the existing organisational police strategies. Instead, the need for quick, creative decisions and approaches is perceived, which for example can be ritualised in culturally specific contexts and – although they can be conducive to problem solving – quickly contradict the organisational guidelines. Dealing with such deviations from the norm is an important source for the further development of the police, since they can also indicate, for example, phenomena of legal and organisational under- and overregulation. In this respect it is possible to see certain functionality for the organisation even in the illegal act (cf. Luhmann 1964, 304 ff).

3.2.2 The role of management

The fact that mistakes happen is known to those involved in management. Nevertheless (or precisely because of this) an attempt is made to construct a flawless image of the police and to emphasise the mistake as an individual case in the explicit knowledge that deviations from the formal organisational rules are by no means merely exceptions to the factual order (cf. Ullrich 2019, 179). In external relations, the image of a completely intact and flawless organisation must be preserved at all costs (Feltes 2012a, 289). These attempts to secure legitimacy can be attributed in particular to the fear of negative consequences for the organisation and for one's own person or career. Here again, the police habitus proves to be an incorporated learning process in the police field. In this context, it is interesting to note that managers generally

assess the error management culture of their own organisation much more openly than employees experience it. In a study conducted by management consultants Ernst & Young[3], for example, 66 % of managers surveyed stated that they cultivated an open discussion culture between employees and managers, whereas only 42 % of employees also rated this as a no-blame culture.[4] This is particularly problematic against the background of the key position of managers in the context of a no-blame culture, since their own behaviour and their own approach to mistakes exert a major influence on the error management culture experienced in the respective organisational unit.

3.2.3 The "legal corset"

Police work in a democratic society sometimes places paradoxical demands on police officers: in order to maintain public safety and order and to avert dangers, police officers are permitted to use force to prevent violence. They are authorised to break the law in order to enforce it (cf. Niederhoffer 1967, 97). Mistakes in this area usually lead to the evaluation of actions as criminal behaviour. Police actions must therefore always take place within the limits of legal authority and quickly fall into a dichotomy of the categories "criminal offence/non-criminal offence". The close connection through the principle of legality offers no discretionary scope, especially in the case of situations liable to result in criminal proceedings, and basically focuses on sanctioning mistakes. If police officers are not in a position to report the misconduct of their colleagues in the specific situation – for example due to excessive psychosocial demands (cf. Behrendes 2003, 172 ff) –, they commit a punishable obstruction of justice in office. As a result, you will also face sanctions, which will ensure that mistakes are always associated with negative consequences and guilt, and that they are concealed or covered up. Furthermore, due to the state's inherent monopoly on criminal prosecution, only the public prosecutor's office and the police are authorised to conduct investigations. As a consequence of this, the police – as the "controller of facts" in the investigation procedure – must investigate themselves and thus have the "dominance of definition over reality" (cf. Sack 2010, 36).

In addition to criminal consequences, mistakes may also be prosecuted under disciplinary law, which is sometimes seen by police officers as a more serious liability: the analysis of mistakes may regularly have a negative impact on the evaluation and thus on career prospects (cf. Jasch 2017, 102). Bureaucratic sanctions continue to be the dominant reaction to misconduct. In most cases these do not contribute to initiating a constructive learning process, but often justify the loss of self-esteem of the person concerned (cf. Volkmer 2004, 86).

3.3 Masculinity models of police culture

The values and norms that are firmly connected to the police organisation are expressed in it. The values proclaimed – the so-called "espoused theory" – are not relevant for the development of a no-blame culture, but rather the values and norms actually experienced in the "theory in use" (Ebner et al. 2008, 235). This perception corresponds with the research on the police culture, where the greatest impact is attributed in particular to the experienced culture (cop culture).

3.3.1 Cop culture

The cop culture represents the necessary breakthrough of the police culture through non-bureaucratic patterns of action (cf. Behr 2000, 16 ff). The patterns of action that develop from the everyday experi-

ences of the police officers may in some cases develop disproportionately within the police culture and may result in overstepping the powers and competences of the actors in their actions, although this is not in itself a deviant subculture. Overstepping competences becomes particularly clear where everyday police work deviates strongly from the requirements, objectives and legal situation governing police work (cf. Haselow/Schümchen 2004, 276 ff). This indicates the high susceptibility to mistakes observed from the outside, which, however, does not necessarily have to be perceived in the internal relationship between the members of the cop culture: extending or overstepping powers can be seen here as a legitimate means of fulfilling tasks (and not as mistakes).

The effectiveness of cop culture becomes evident as soon as new police officers enter the police force, as patterns of action and general customs, these "second codes", are passed on to them through interaction with experienced police officers in the field. These everyday practices of "real" police work often differ from the theoretical knowledge transfer of police training (cf. Behr 2008, 237). In this process, dealing with mistakes in the police also reproduces itself.

3.3.2 The contribution of police academisation

The academisation of police training was implicitly linked to the expectation that it would have a positive influence on the later everyday work of police officers. In particular, the provision of education, which supplemented the training that had previously been more vocational, is regarded as a suitable means of generating a necessary reflexivity among prospective police officers, which could, among other things, support a no-blame culture (cf. Jasch 2019, 237). In principle, efforts can be seen here to develop a value-bound, partnership-based, community-oriented understanding of the profession characterised by mutual trust (Seidensticker 2019).

It should be noted, however, that it is precisely the design of the study programmes – with rigorously predefined modules and their contents largely designed by police practitioners, with focus on exam performances[5] and a strict obligation to attend – that often leads to a socialisation of police concepts of order rather than a critical reflection of the development of police officers. In addition to the explicit teaching of the curriculum, police officers are also taught the informal rules of the game in the field, including the expectation of a high degree of conformity and loyalty. Role ambiguity developed during studies that can result from simultaneous affiliation with the academic and practical police fields may offer the potential to reduce the influence of an unreflected assumption of the common belief (doxa) of practical police work on the habitus of students (Dübbers 2015, 53 ff).

3.3.3 Hegemonic masculinity in the police

Aspects of the reproduction of traditional models of masculinity can be found in the police. Both the strong influence of police practitioners on the curricula and the immanent practical obligation of the studies as well as the practical phases during the studies contribute to the reproduction of hegemonic constructions of masculinity (Connell 1999). In both cases, the myth of the police is conveyed within the framework of heroic stories, which usually construct police masculinity in the context of danger and violence and stylise it as an essential element of police identity (cf. Hunold 2019, 51 ff). Practical trainers shape the image of the fundamentally suitable man and the woman subordinate to him, who must first prove her suitability

for the police service (cf. Behr 2000, 165). While men can perform well, good performances by women are only perceived as "good for a woman". The effectiveness of hegemonic masculinity reproduces an aggressive masculinity as the core of the logic of action in the police and shapes a masculinity-centred cop culture (cf. Behr 2000; id. 2008) in which the new police officers are immersed. Violent action and a strict expectation of loyalty as characteristics attributed to this male-dominated culture promote a latency of error within the organisational units. Moreover, the models of masculinity are of a competitive nature: police masculinities want to and have to compete with others and are basically shaped as a winning identity, so they always leave the field as winners in their self-image. Admitting mistakes has no place under this identity.

The persons involved in the police see themselves as the embodiment of the "good" and thus always associate themselves with terms such as "good" and "right". Based on Jacques Rancière (Rancière 2002) and his understanding of policing as the desired ideal order, a continuous effort is made to achieve or maintain a condition – as the least bad version of the ideal at the time. The creation or maintenance of ideal conditions is diametrically opposed to the mistake, which is understood as a deviation from a standard and usually has negative consequences. Mistakes are therefore more likely to be associated with attributes such as "bad" or "evil". This categorisation cannot subsequently be reconciled with the attribution of police and masculinity, which is why it is always necessary to proclaim the flawlessness of the institution and its personnel, both internally and externally.

The organisational culture that acts as a determining pattern of action thus reproduces a negative blame culture and it becomes clear that a positive no-blame culture is difficult to reconcile with forms of hegemonic masculinity. At this point it can be argued that learning from mistakes is particularly important in highly specialised organisational units, although it can be assumed that at the same time aggressive masculinity has a hegemonic effect in these highly segregated areas of work. It can be stated here that even though there is a error management culture in these organisational units, its manifestation is based on two characteristics. On the one hand, highly specialised units are more concerned with avoiding mistakes than with learning from mistakes, although these two dimensions are difficult to separate. On the other hand, the imagined error management culture refers almost exclusively to the tactical components of the activity, i.e. the procedure in specific operational situations, which is aimed in particular at protecting or avoiding risks for one's own group and trusting the (mostly male) colleagues in the unit. At this level, it is imperative to address mistakes in the context of risks to one's own solidarity community and to avoid them as far as possible. However, this objective – i.e. the protection of one's own group against external risks – can lead to mistakes below this level becoming less addressed. An example of such mistakes is the excessive use of force in arrests. The strong bond to one's own group as a self-protective community and the negative learning process with regard to dealing with mistakes in the organisation play a major role here. At the same time, an attempt is made to adapt the strategy of avoiding mistakes as practised in the tactical field. As a consequence, this can lead to mistakes not being discussed but covered up and not being avoided as a result (if these actions are identified as mistakes at all). In this respect, we can speak of selective reflexivity within the

framework of highly specialised, segregated organisational units.

4. ACTION FIELDS OF ERROR MANAGEMENT CULTURE IN THE POLICE

Individuals and organisations can only use new action strategies for themselves if they both know and consciously discern what is not working. Necessary organisational development fields can be illustrated and arranged by the "house of error management culture in the police" (see illustration).

Source: Seidensticker 2016



The house of error management culture in the police

4.1 Values and norms

If a no-blame culture is to be established in the police on a long-term basis, this presupposes a fundamental change at the cultural level and thus requires different points of reference. A no-blame culture can only develop into the self-image of the police in mutual dependence. This self-conception develops particularly in the individual organisational units and is reproduced there. At the same time, continuous irritation is experienced as new recruits enter the police. At this point it becomes clear that even the selection of personnel can influence the development of an error management culture in the organisation. If the selection of suitable applicants focuses on the social skills and character aptitude that are absolutely necessary, at least in their basic principles (cf. Feltes 2012b, 309), and if these are taken up and deepened during their studies, the police culture can be positively influenced in its approach to dealing with mistakes. In addition, the aim of police recruitment must be to provide applicants with a realistic and at the same time forward-looking impression of the police profession. In this way, personalities with suitable expectations can be won over to the police, who develop a profession-specific self-image that meets the demands of the police.

Managers play an important role in the practical confrontation of prospective police officers during their studies. A similar conclusion is reached by the "Leadership Barometer" according to the Forsa study[6] in 2018, which locates the key figures of a no-blame culture particularly in the area of middle management. Here, the acceptance of a constructive approach to dealing with mistakes in management understanding must be established and demonstrated in practice. It is only possible to deal constructively with mistakes if managers are able to create a climate of trust, appreciation and (fear-)free communication in their everyday work (Seidensticker 2019).

4.2 Competences

The learning potential of a mistake can only be used if it is identified as a mistake, if there is an awareness of the potential inherent in a mistake and if it is deliberately used as a source of learning. Police officers therefore need a high level of competence in identifying mistakes (Seidensticker 2019). They must be able to identify the fundamental importance of mistakes as a learning opportunity for the entire organisation (ability) (Fahlbruch/ Förster 2010, 25) and want to use this

potential (necessity). Finally, they must also be given the opportunity to learn from mistakes (authorisation). The ability to reflect on dealing with mistakes must not serve the purpose of constructing justifications and thus generating immunity against criticism of mistakes (cf. Heid 2015, 48).

As has already been stated, the management of the organisation has a crucial role to play. In order to create the necessary openness at management level, it is first necessary to communicate the benefits of a no-blame culture. The conviction must prevail that a constructive no-blame culture can promote the individual development of employees and strengthen emotional ties to the organisation. On this basis it is important to impart competences on how to deal constructively with one's own mistakes and what opportunities there are to enable employees to learn from their mistakes. The competence of employees to deal constructively with mistakes – as well as the competence of managers – is a critical success factor. Managers can best influence the development of competences if they see themselves as developmental coaches for their employees (cf. Barthel/Heidemann 2013). Strongly developed competences in this area can also have positive effects on the entire organisation and, in particular, further professionalise the management process.

4.3 Tools

Reflection on one's own behaviour holds considerable potential for prevention, as does intervention or subsequent feedback from colleagues (cf. Schicht 2007, 34). In order to use this potential, police officers need support in the form of so-called tools.

Briefing/debriefing is a comparatively easy tool to establish. While briefings are already very common at the beginning of the service and are standard in many parts of the police force, debriefing plays a secondary role. It is true that under the concept of operation debriefing, which is established in the police regulations, a debriefing of all kinds of operations should take place in an institutionalised form. In practice, however, this tool is usually only used for outstanding events. However, this sporadic application fails to identity the learning potential that can arise from standardised or routine activities in particular. The standard use of debriefing at the end of a service as a tool for a no-blame culture can help to establish a deliberate and constructive handling of mistakes and contribute to the professionalisation of police work. Debriefing contributes to the production of a no-blame culture by adopting the norms and values of the police officers already communicated during their studies, applying them in practice and thus consolidating them. Police management, in particular, is responsible for conducting an operation debriefing.

In order to take account of the aspect of the excessive psychosocial demands of reporting collegial misconduct, the statutory regulation of a reflection and counselling period would be necessary in order to avoid one's own criminal liability for obstructing justice (cf. Mihalic 2017). This necessity becomes particularly clear when one considers the possible negative effects of a report on one's own professional career and collegial cooperation in the social environment of the police. Such a regulation must be understood as a tool which enables and promotes a constructive no-blame culture within the framework of the legal corset of the principle of legality. In addition to a legally regulated consultation and reflection period, there is of course a need for suitable independent bodies which are not subject to the principle of legality and which make it possible to advise police officers in the context of any criminal misconduct committed by colleagues.

In addition to the examples of tools discussed other beneficial tools – such as supervision (see e.g. Uhlmann/Vera 2015; Behr 2004) or so-called Critical Incident Reporting Systems (see Seidensticker 2016) – are conceivable.

5. CONCLUSION

Mistakes are certainly not pleasant events for the individual and become even more unpleasant the more public their appearance is (cf. Jasch 2017, 100). Organisations also usually find it difficult to acknowledge mistakes because they stain a flawless and perfect reputation in the initial perception and do not indicate embodied professionalism. Accordingly, individuals and organisations like to quickly evaluate the mistake as a regrettable single case or try to cover it up. Discussions about mistakes seldom focus on causes and necessary improvements, but quickly develop into a hunt for the culprits and label them as the "black sheep" of the organisation. In this way, the "guilty parties" are deliberately excluded from the otherwise flawlessly functioning organisation and thus often the attention is averted from structural or cultural problem situations. From the point of view of the organisation, this practice can even be regarded as functional by trying to achieve organisational stability through personal attributions to actions (cf. Türk 1995, 12). Since the individual certainly only reluctantly wants to make him or herself available as the target of such a witch hunt, this approach to mistakes contributes further to understanding them as negative events that must be avoided at all costs. This promotes and reproduces a culture of fear and security (cf. Wehner 2013, 28; Mensching 2004), which can have a negative impact on the health of police officers (cf. Seidensticker 2019, 13; Uhlmann/Vera 2015, 115). The basis of a constructive no-blame culture is the insight that mistakes occur in all organisations and in organisational forms. Only then can a learning-oriented approach to handling mistakes be initiated, which is particularly necessary in public administrations in order to remain capable of action in the future (cf. Römer 2012, 98).

[1] *German Research Foundation.*

[2] *In Lügde, North Rhine-Westphalia, three men allegedly abused at least 31 children over a period of ten years. In 2019, the police investigation measures attracted a great deal of media attention when various investigation slip-ups became known. Among other things, a large amount of evidence had been lost or not sufficiently secured at the scene of the crime.*

[3] *https://www.faz.net/-gqi-9ffzx.*

[4] *Similar results can be seen when considering the self-perceptions and external perceptions of management and employees on duty with regard to experienced management behaviour. This makes it clear that management assess their management behaviour much more positively than their employees perceive it (cf. Seidensticker 2015).*

[5] *In addition, poor exam performances do not necessarily bring about improvement and learn ing processes among students. Instead, the provision of exam performance is identified as an end in itself and thus a necessary evil and contributes to regulation instead of contributing to learning from mistakes (cf. Haselow/Schümchen 2004, 270 ff).*

[6] *Available online at https://penning-consulting.com/publikationen/.*

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