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Migration and Security— an Unusual Perspective?



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“Security policy is kept in the hands of those who define what a threat is.”¹

Addressing the comprehensive field of migration research, this paper attempts to trace the relationship between, and offer an in-depth analysis of, migration and (internal²) security both in perception by society as well as in the political and scientific discourse³. In dealing with this issue, one is easily tempted to overdo and lose track of the conceptual framework. Being a typical cross-sectoral matter⁴ and a part of migration research and other relevant fields, this issue is overly complex and intertwined. As an example, one could quote here the strong focus on security studies and their development; the research on identity and nation states in the post-Westphalian world, notably in light of the European integration process; questions related to the statistical coverage of delinquent behavior; and last but not least the thematic interdependencies resulting from an extended perception of security. While presenting the state of the art of research and examining the changing concept of security, this paper focuses on an analysis of purported and real security risks that (may) directly or indirectly result from immigration, and on demonstrating the link to various theories, such as the theory of the securitization⁵ of migration.

PREFACE

Migration is an important issue on the global, national, and regional levels; its relevance for Europe has been identified – also in light of a changing environment in which migration takes place today – and has moved increasingly into the center of interest of politics, media, and other (opinion leader) groups of society. Net immigration to the EU-27 has, after all, reached a minimum of 900,000 people per year⁶, with Germany in the top position. But even Austria’s net immigration of about 34,000 persons per year is of a more than significant scale, representing a problem that should be handled by employing adequate political concepts. Fassmann, by the way, acknowledges

Austria’s good performance and counts it among the “mature” immigration countries (similar to the North European countries), where the political and legal system has, on the whole, been prepared and equipped for the challenges that may result from immigration.⁷ All in all, there is a duality of economic development and state action that can be observed as probably the most important factor influencing migration policy. For example, if a certain category of workforce is needed, society will develop forces accordingly to influence state action.

Various actors of society depicting migrants/migration as a security threat attributed to organized crime in connection with the question for the role of identity and “double” loyalty, not infrequently

insinuated (in a roundabout way), that immigrants and their descendants are faced with, and also the weight that police (but also pertinent research conducted in the field of organized crime⁸) attaches to transnational networks, for the success of organized crime are essential aspects of approaching this issue, which direct attention to the debate on transnationalism.⁹ This is the point where, last but not least, “Expansion of the Concept of Security” to the vague spectrum of subjectivity and emotion comes into the picture, focusing – among other things – on the question of “cultural” threat.

As a matter of fact, experience of discrimination in the immigration country’s society may, on the one hand, result in a re-attachment to the culture of the parents (of the second, at times even in the third generation) and – in rare and extreme cases – give rise to the risk of political and religious radicalization. On the other hand, it is interesting how the “threat” to cultural homogeneity is presented by various actors as a security risk. These propositions indicate the wide scope of the subject and in how many migration research segments migration can be (academically) related to the question of security. Thus, in order to apply a scientific approach, the author thinks it is necessary to introduce some system in the future, by classifying the various levels of security discourse as related to migration – which, however, cannot possibly be accomplished within the scope of this paper.¹⁰ However, as an initial impulse, the most essential points where “migration” and “security” meet are to be analyzed and presented in an overview.

A LOOK INTO THE STATE OF THE ART OF RESEARCH

Given the new dimensions of migration – induced by globalization, improved mobility and other factors – regarding its

volume and, above all, its possible cruising range, an increasing number of scientists have joined the abovementioned actors in discussing this issue. The engagement of scientists in migratory movement research is nothing new; contrary to other (stand-alone) disciplines, this may almost be seen as an established field of science. The fact that migratory movements have existed in history since the dawn of humankind, does, however, relativize this view to some extent.

Ernest Ravenstein can be called the pioneer of migration research, establishing this field of research in 1885 with his book “The Laws of Migration”.¹¹ Based on micro-census data, he attempted to trace migration movements occurring in Great Britain during the period of industrialization, thus choosing an approach determined by the socio-economic upheavals of his times. A number of further “classical” approaches followed, and Everett Lee’s “Theory of Push and Pull Factors”¹² is certainly among the best known. However, parallel to the changes in the conditions under which migration took place, migration research also evolved further and became increasingly interdisciplinary, above all by the inclusion of sociology. In 1993, Douglas Massey et al.¹³ performed the so far most comprehensive survey on migration theories, starting with theories originated in the neoclassical economy, such as the world system theory¹⁴, via other approaches such as the network theory¹⁵ or the migration system theory¹⁶ (which cannot be addressed here in more detail).

An important element that the new theories of migration research have in common is the critical approach by which the consequences for both the sending and the receiving countries, as well as for the migrants themselves, are also surveyed.¹⁷

MIGRATION RESEARCH AND SECURITY STUDIES

Pursuant to the approach followed so far, migration research and security studies constitute academic sub-disciplines of “international relations”. While the trend, as already stated, strongly moves towards inter- or trans-disciplinarity, the approach, however, remains dominated by political science. The main reference point is the state as the central element of power in the field of migration. “The emphasis in the discipline is on the state and the acts of the state around flows of people.”¹⁸ Research has so far devoted little attention to how the state construes the individual as a stranger.¹⁹ The critical theory, on the other hand, offers another point of view by involving also social and cultural aspects in the analysis. In the course of this enhanced scientific approach, the focus moves increasingly towards the individual as such or the question of the power, emanating from the state, to define “foreigners” (and thus their legal status as well).

In view of this background, and relying on the “Critical Security Studies” (CSS), which do not shift the state into the centre of interest but try on a wide basis to trace the reasons of (the lack of) security and plead for an enhanced concept of security²⁰, Elspeth Guilt, in her latest book entitled “Security and Migration in the 21st Century”²¹, coins the term “Critical Migration Studies” (CMS) based on the theses of Critical Security Studies. CSS treat security studies as a subject of research of its own, where the question of what “security” actually means is the centre point of interest. CMS try to describe the process of deconstruction of the various areas of power held by the state and constitute a link between CSS and migration research.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN TRANSITION

Security has always been not only an objective but also the prime purpose of the state as a whole, and thus the traditional, state-centered approach of security (or at times also strategic) studies is a first thought. However, looking at the implicitness of this sovereign duty of the state, one soon notices that even within the scope of a narrow concept of security (e.g. physical integrity and protection from crime) there is certainly room for interpretation, depending on which definition the term “security” is based on. In this context, the following resolution of the German Federal Constitutional Court should be quoted: “The security of the state, as the constitutional power of peace and order, and the security it is to ensure for its population, are constitutional values ranking on an equal footing with others and are inalienable, because the state as an institution derives from them its true and ultimate justification.”²²

The borderline drawn between internal and external security cannot be upheld in the form existing so far (or until the termination of the Cold War and as a consequence of the disintegration of Yugoslavia). However, this sustained development has only been taken into systematic account to a small extent by the distribution of national state powers. While the armed forces and the police²³ transgress each other’s scope of jurisdiction, thus creating a (desired or undesired) competitive situation, the importance of the “security issue” is, on the whole, not likely to diminish – actually, the contrary is true.²⁴ These attempts, however, appear to have evolved historically and supported by one-sided interests rather than an aspect of comprehensive, new security architecture.

Therefore, for example, the following description of “security policy” can be

found on a website of the Austrian armed forces: “With an ‘enhanced security concept’, since the end of the Cold War other risks have also moved into the field of vision of security policy. International terrorism, state failure, organized crime, short supply of resources, fragile infrastructures, cultural and economic disparities, environmental risks, epidemics/pandemics or illegal migration can be further potential threats to the pillars of society.”²⁵

In the – so far most sophisticated – concept defining the dimensions of “security”, Buzan et al.²⁶ elaborated on the political dimension of this enlarged concept of security. They differentiate between horizontal and vertical levels. The horizontal level has five different aspects: the military, police, economic, ecological and social aspects of security. The vertical level is divided into human security national security, regional security and global security. As it has been briefly described, the traditional differences between internal and external security, security of the rule of law, social security etc. become increasingly ineffective because societal developments result in more and more interaction between these areas that at first glance appear separate from each other.²⁷

The Copenhagen School (= Buzan et al.) describes the five aspects of the horizontal level as follows: “(...) the military sector is about (...) forceful coercion; the political sector is about (...) authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about (...) trade, production and finance; the societal sector is about (...) collective identity; the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.”²⁸

However, in enhancing the state-centered, traditional concept of security (as subject of research of the security/strategic studies) to become a too wide term, there is a danger

of losing the conceptual framework and making “all and nothing” a security issue. This is not purely an academic danger. By such an enhancement of the concept, which is sensible in the author’s view, a wide scope of issues can be lent a security component and treated as such also on a political level, having various potential consequences. Certainly, an issue “labeled” that way will gain more importance for the public, and many things can be politically justified with the “security argument” – here, acceptance by (the majority of) the population appears by all means granted.²⁹ However, there is an immanent danger of instrumentalization and securitization in this respect, which requires a high sense of responsibility on the part of the actors involved.

Basically, the present discourse on restructuring this issue covers the relationship between security, territory and the state’s monopoly of power, which provides for the state’s sovereignty, and this is why – following the logic of Weaver et al. – any form of security studies is in one or the other way related to (if not centered on) the state³⁰.

With regard to the segment “migration”, this enhanced “new” concept of security is interesting as it makes migration itself, as an actually global, transnational phenomenon, a possible agenda of (internal³¹) security. The concept of societal security is an especially strong argument here.

“Societal Security concerns the ability of the society to persist in its essential character under changing positions and possible or actual threats (...) Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms.”³²

The legitimacy of immigration restrictions by the state is often justified with reasons, such as that they are necessary in order to safeguard certain capacities of the

state enabling it to make certain public goods available to its inhabitants (there is an obvious question of definition arising already at this point: Does this term mean all persons living in the territory of the state or its citizens only?). Besides guaranteeing social stability, defending cultural identity is frequently introduced as a fundamental task of the state. Both of these aspects may be threatened by migration, so it is no surprise that when enhancing the concept of security (since the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s/the end of the Cold War, and the resulting necessity to re-structure the security agenda), migration is increasingly judged through the security lens.³³ Last but not least, the issue of identity is essential for the concept of the national state within the European integration process, and this is why questions related, for instance, to new dimensions of security, tasks (and justification of existence) of the national state, and a higher emphasis on what is “in common” and what “separates” (on different levels) are becoming more important than in Cold War times, where friend-or-foe identification could be easily accomplished.

Already in 1994, the classical political concept of security was enhanced by the United Nations Development Programme³⁴ into the concept of “human security”. Under the concept developed by the United Nations, it is not the security of states (political security, internal security, nuclear security, military security, etc.) but rather the security of persons, i.e. the security of the individuals’ status that is in the focus of attention. This is based on the assumption that the universal concern of the security of people is threatened not only by military and/or political conflicts, but, among other things, also by poverty, unemployment, threats and crimes, terrorist attacks, scarcity of resources, overpopulation and violation of human rights.³⁵ While the concept of

human security is (intentionally?) formulated in a very vague manner, leaving much room for interpretation, it must face the criticism that it has as its subject “all and nothing”. The Copenhagen School, for example, rejects this understanding of security by saying that “Societal security is not used (...) as a ‘more human’ concept of security negating state security. We do not follow those theorists whose search for an alternative to state security leads them to individual security (sometimes called global security) (...)”³⁶.

In justification, one might argue that the concept did not offer any academically designed new security architecture, but it was intended to claim that the military expenditure presumably saved after the end of the Cold War be appropriated as “peace dividends” and spent, for instance, on economic development policy instruments.³⁷

Relatively simultaneously with the discourse on an enhanced concept of security and the necessity to face the new world order and the new security architecture with adequate academic (and following that, political) concepts in hand, the term “subjective security” also emerged, as a result of which the assessment of threat is now greatly detached from objective criteria and transferred into the realm of individual interpretation.

Differentiating subjective and objective security stems from the police-authority environment, and it is generally held in social science literature that this method does not make much sense because it is based on the assumption that takes the “objectivity of security” granted.³⁸ By all means self-critical and, therefore, interesting in this context are the statements of the German Federal Office for Criminal Investigation (department: criminal sciences): “(...) Security or insecurity certainly have no objective, intersubjectively un-

ambiguous factual references; security or insecurity are concepts communicated and defined on a subjective level. They are communicated in a multi-layered process of interaction and interpretation in society and politics and they always contain a specific fear/apprehensibility component, as it has been long established in psychological research. When the police rightfully claim that there is no absolute security, this subjective perspective is confirmed. If there were such a thing as objective security, that is, security detached from subjective apprehensions, it would have to be possible to create absolute security as well, either technically or in some other objective way. Security is therefore subjectively determined, and as a rule transported or constituted by communicative means. Thus, security (...) is also suited to become the subject of political orchestrations. I think that we all have at some time witnessed such orchestrations.”³⁹

It can be observed at the same time that there is an increasing demand in society for “security”, as a valuable asset, which is not necessarily based on objective criminalistic developments.

A reason for increasing insecurity is often seen in the changed framework conditions of the globalized and highly industrialized society with its high complexity and the resulting enormous individual challenges – and thus in the increase of social, occupational, economic etc. risks.⁴⁰

The solution-oriented approach⁴¹, advocating an enlarged concept of security, while addressing the reasons of conflicts and threats to security, also offers policy-makers comprehensive framework conditions for the solution of (global, regional, etc.) problems (so it is not surprising that the concept of “human security”, as already mentioned, does not stem from academic circles, but rather from the environment of the United Nations, committed to find

global solutions/approaches for different fields).

However, representatives from the academic field are also in favor of a broad security concept of this kind, such as the Oxford Research Group, which, among other things, excelled through its fervent criticism of the argumentative logic of the US’s Iraq policies. “Furthermore, the current response to insecurity is essentially about ‘control’ – attempting to maintain the status quo through military force, without addressing the root causes. The authors argue that such security policies are self-defeating in the long-term, and so a new approach is urgently needed. An alternative, the ‘sustainable security’ approach aims to address the root causes of those threats, cooperatively using the most effective means available. For example: renewable energy and conservation as the most important response to climate change; energy efficiency as a response to resource competition; intensive poverty reduction programmes as a means to address marginalisation; and the halting and reversal of WMD⁴² development and proliferation as a main component of checking global militarisation. These provide the best chance of averting global disaster as well as address some of the root causes of terrorism.”⁴³

In a detailed study of the subject, it would be necessary to take a closer look at terms such as “society”, “state”, “nation”, “threat”, or “identity”, which are just mentioned here, in order to give the reader an idea of the various dimensions of this segment.

SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

Security is, last but not least, important in political discussion because maintaining it secures and legitimizes the state’s power monopoly.⁴⁴ Therefore, as already sugges-

ted, the trend induced by different groups of society and varying motives illustrates a multitude of subjects from a security point of view. From this perspective, it becomes understandable as to why the segment “migration” is also often dealt with from a security point of view, since the subject does, as a matter of fact, combine two essential aspects of state sovereignty: security and control regarding who is under what conditions allowed to stay within the territory of a state. The framework conditions changing since the end of the Cold War and the related re-structuring of security architecture, as well as the concept of security (and thus the object of reference of security studies) have already been addressed in this paper both globally and on a European level. The amendment and the enhancement of the concept of security have affected not only the military sector but also the police force has expanded its radius of activities accordingly, and as a result, the concept of European internal security has been developed and put into practice in police cooperation.⁴⁵ With the implementation of the Schengen Area, EU border control activities were expanded (or shifted) to non-European borders as well, causing police work to develop more and more towards taking preventive steps – in addition to their intrinsic task of fighting crime.⁴⁶ However, at issue here is no longer only prosecution after an offence has been committed or specific defense against danger, but increasingly the prevention of danger or right away “precautionary security measures”.⁴⁷

Since the attacks of 11th September 2001 in the USA, and subsequently in Madrid and London, migration policy has been increasingly related to the asylum agenda and, above all, to security aspects.⁴⁸ While this relationship has been apparent for some time (since the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s), the amount of attention is new.

These trends as a whole resulted in creating a “security continuum”, as described by Bigo⁴⁹ already in 1994, placing actually separate factors, such as Islam and Islamism, migration and (organized) crime, etc., in a quasi-natural context, and resulting in a need for corresponding policies. “The old external threat of communism was replaced by an external threat established by mass immigration, organized crime, and imported terrorism (...).”⁵⁰ These contexts seem to have been established to an extent that the policies building on such assumptions are rarely challenged, and most of them have already entered the stage of “common sense”. In this regard, a new review of popular notions and increased cooperation between science, politics, media, and administration – subject to an optimum use of resources – would be highly desirable.

MIGRATION AS A SECURITY RISK – A DIFFERENT KIND OF RISK ANALYSIS

Let me begin by stating that in social science research (above all in the German-speaking area), describing in a comprehensive and pragmatic manner the correlations of migration in a security (risk) context⁵¹, there is by all means room for improvement.

According to Bauböck⁵², the debate on this subject⁵³ can be sub-divided into the following three phases: The phase of recruitment of immigrant workers in the early 1960s (associated with the first concerns regarding a cultural conflict), the phase of the economic crisis and recession starting in the mid-1970s (when foreigners were increasingly perceived as a “problem” that was difficult to shift off) and the opening of the borders to the former communist states in the early 1990s (when the issue of [organized] crime ruled the debates). Since 2001, it is definitely the culture

clash issue that has repeatedly gained increased attention (cf. the discourse on Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*⁵⁴, Muhammad cartoons etc.).

Each of these three phases may also be further associated with one of the following theories⁵⁵:

1. The culture conflict thesis: In this context, the "alien criminals" issue was discussed and warned against in public for the first time. The argument was put forward that an alleged failure to cope with the new culture would be accompanied by conflicts and inclination towards violence or a higher degree of socially conspicuous behavior. The high degree of readiness for adjustment of the guest workers' generation eventually contradicted this thesis.
2. The social deficiency situation thesis: The crime pressure on the second generation is said to result from breaching the economic growth promise. As a facet of the social deficiency situation thesis, reference is to be made here also to the stigmatization theory, which tries to address the discrimination of foreigners during criminal investigation.
3. The thesis on the ability of foreigners to organize crime: This theory emerged in the early 1990s claiming that the combination of (now) free, uncontrollable capital, transnational networks (which migrants would form in the local society) and increased mobility would result in an increase of the alien crime rate, especially in the field of organized crime.⁵⁶

In the following part, an attempt is made to illustrate popular argumentation patterns and to examine them by analyzing the basic approaches applied.⁵⁷

Basically, it is, above all, uncontrolled immigration that is perceived as a threat. On the one hand, directly, as it is said to make criminal acts easier and, on the other

hand, indirectly, by resulting in societal conditions which might undermine the ability of the state to maintain law and order. This way of looking at things is not necessarily to be judged as wrong, but in any case it is too simple.⁵⁸

Basically, there are a number of aspects to be considered in an objective and value free manner when looking at the correlation between migration and security; based on Bauböck's deliberations, these aspects can be described as follows:

1. The freedom of movement of persons constitutes a value in itself as a "manifestation of personal autonomy".⁵⁹ It is an important feature of democratic states. Freedom of movement also has a positive impact on economic growth and thus on the prosperity of the entire society.
2. Illegalization of immigration may itself jeopardize security. Therefore, for example, fortifying borders may prevent self-organized help for illegal border crossing, which results in an increased formation of cliques contributing to illegal border crossing (or contributes to illegal border crossing in general). Moreover, one can safely assume that the illegal resident status (or the lack of a proper work permit) contributes to misdemeanors such as moonlighting. Furthermore, the restriction of freedom of movement across the borders creates new offences, such as e.g. "illegal immigration" or "illegal residence"⁶⁰ Finally, in this context the increasing number of victims among asylum seekers⁶¹ is also to be pointed out.
3. The closing of borders (or making legal immigration more difficult) may trigger more immigration on a short-term basis. This effect results from a certain "last minute panic", prompting, on the one hand, a faster realization of (potential) migration attempts, or, on the other

hand, persons already resident (illegally) in the country not to leave it anymore because an intended return becomes impossible or possible only under more severe conditions. This reduces in the long run “circular migration”, i.e. traveling back and forth between home country and immigration country. In addition, the academic environment is right in asking whether border control really contributes to increasing security⁶². It is an absolutely relevant argument to be raised here that the opening of the Schengen borders, for example, had no significant impact on the crime rate in Austria – the Burgenland province, a 100 % border region, has the lowest crime rate in the whole country⁶³, because the least number of criminals are arrested at the border. This is another reason to challenge policies concentrating on the borderline, as they are much easier to overcome by organized crime than by “normal” immigrants, who, as opposed to those other ones, do not aim at committing offences. “The effectiveness of such measures must always be judged in view of whether they are suitable to curb the activities and filter out the persons that threaten internal security.”⁶⁴

Let me mention at this point the theory by which many (in most cases socially weak) immigrants may trigger an “anti-democratic backlash” (backlash argument), resulting in an eventual increase of people adhering to extreme right (populist), nationalist and racist parties (definitely representing another potential threat to security).

And let me finally refer to the “networking theory”, where chain migration and the resulting formation of transnational networks have created optimum conditions for infiltrating state structures, offering a fertile soil for agitation precipitating organized crime.

Recently, the basic approaches applied in scientific discourse on the subject have increasingly focused on the security hazards threatening migrants in the target society, e.g. through racist assaults and violence.⁶⁵

It can altogether be presumed that – following Dietrich⁶⁶ – it certainly does make a difference whether immigrants appear as a “problem” or burden for social security (in terms of safe jobs or assurance to have appropriate access to social benefits) or whether they appear in the extremely discomfiting guise of an “illegal alien”.

Consequently, as established by Pilgram, “A more stringent ‘contest’ will and can exert a deterring influence on undesired migrant men and women, but it also influences the form of migration, the type of migrant men and women, the relationship between them and organs of the state as well as the target society as a whole and how insecurity is perceived by all elements involved.” He continues, “If interaction between controlling authorities and migrants is handled by the model of crime control, it will be more annoying and more risky for both sides.”⁶⁷

A new logic of argumentation, plausible in itself, can actually emerge if the concept of internal security is expanded to areas such as “maintaining cultural homogeneity” or social security, which again would link up with the securitization of the migration issue.⁶⁸

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The challenges that the actors of security policy are faced with today are different from those even only 20 years ago. The downfall of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain introduced a re-structuring process of security architecture which as of yet has not terminated. In addition, other environmental conditions are important for designing “security”. There is a

want for security in modern highly industrialized societies⁶⁹ facing again and again new challenges both on the collective as well as on the individual level. This increasing complexity creates a longing for simplification, a need well suited for instrumentalizations.

Here, politics and the media have the responsibility to stand for an un-agitated and knowledge-based treatment of the issue and to resist the dangers of populism and simplification. This temptation is substantial and becomes even more articulate if one includes in the picture “statehood crisis”: “Instrumentalization of crime can be understood as an attempt of re-conquering a piece of the state’s sovereignty that got lost in the process of the global economic takeover of power.”⁷⁰

The various problem fields and the richness of facets of this segment become clear in the debate on the enlargement of the security concept – a discourse that, while initially occurring on an academic level, definitely shows political effects as well – and on the correlative treatment of the issue (with particular regard to migration) within the European integration process. On the one hand, political design should center on taking the security need of people serious and, on the other hand, it

hardly makes sense (with regard to the development of crime) to increasingly rely on implementing the most various security policies that in the first place build on eliminating feelings of insecurity, because to a major extent it is not based on the objective development of crime. Here, other creative solutions are in the asking; such policies require adequate scientific evaluation and reasoning (evidence-based design of politics) and the necessity to expand the perspective of interior security to other fields such as the availability of jobs, social security etc. Modern policies of internal security must therefore consider security to be a “dynamic factor (...), which is subject to constant change and to be differentiated by both objective aspects (crime statistics) and subjective aspects (feeling of security) (...)”⁷¹.

This paper has investigated the correlation of security and migration, raising a number of popular lines of argument, offering a basic analysis thereof, and illustrating the process of how security is defined. Finally, it is to be established that an argumentative linking of these subject matters may only make sense if the aspect of protecting the “cultural homogeneity” of a state or a “people” is also involved in the debate.

¹ Daase, C. (2003). *Sicherheitspolitik und Vergesellschaftung. Ideen zur theoretischen Orientierung der Sicherheitspolitischen Forschung*, in: Daase, C./Feske, S. et al. *Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik. Tendenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt*, Baden-Baden, 45.

² Due to the wide variety of topics and the large amount of literature already

published on this issue, the author attempts to create an overview and to screen this field to the best possible extent, without claiming completeness (what would in any case be an objective too difficult to attain in view of the subject-matter involved).

³ The concept of security and the relevance of this classification will be covered later on in this paper.

⁴ In as much as one can talk about that.

⁵ It is not possible to discuss here in more detail the concept of securitization, so reference is made to e.g. Castles, S./Miller, M. (2009). *The Age of Migration*, New York, 207 ff; to Guiraudon, V./Joppke, C. (Ed.) (2001). *Controlling a New Migration World*, London/New York; or to Buzan, B./Waever, O./de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, London.

- ⁶ According to the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, the annual net immigration in the EU-27 for 2009 amounts to approx. 900,000 already. This figure is based on an Eurostat estimate. Sources: http://gans.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/fileadmin/user_upload/gans/AK_Bevoelkerungsgeographie/Newsletter/Newsletter_89_09_Februar_2010.html.pdf; Eurostat: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY-OFFPUB/KS-QA-09-047/EN/KS-QA-09-047-EN.PDF>. This figure applies, however, to a crisis year. In times of good economic development, the positive balance is expected to repeatedly increase to amounts beyond the +1 million figure.
- ⁷ Cf.: Introductory lecture of Prof. Heinz Fassmann on the interdisciplinary serial lecture entitled "Migration and Integration Research – Multidisciplinary Perspectives", performed on March 8, 2010 at the University of Vienna.
- ⁸ Cf. e.g. Lange, K. (1997). *Transnationale Organisierte Kriminalität (TOK). Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung und Voraussetzungen*, Hans Seidel Stiftung, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, *aktuelle Analysen* (9), München, 11.
- ⁹ Levitt, P./Glick-Schiller, N. (2004). *Conceptualizing Simultaneity. A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society*, *International Migration Review*, 38(145), 10.
- ¹⁰ As a matter of fact, the author is already working on such a classification.
- ¹¹ Ravenstein, E. G. (1885). *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 167–235, <http://www.jstor.org/pss/2979181>, 08/02/2010.
- ¹² What, in spite of many criticisms, is indispensable for dealing with this issue by several disciplines, such as geography and sociology.
- ¹³ Massey, D. (1993). *Theories of International Migration. A Review and Appraisal*, *Population and Development Reviews*, Vol. 19 (No. 3), 431–466.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 447–448.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 449–450.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 454.
- ¹⁷ Zolberg, A. (1989). *The Next Waves. Migration Theory for a Changing World*, *International Migration Review* (23/3), 403 f.
- ¹⁸ Guilt, E. (2009). *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*, Cambridge, 1.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.
- ²⁰ Buzan, B./Waever, O./de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, London.
- ²¹ Guilt, E. (2009). *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*, Cambridge.
- ²² BverfGE (Federal Constitutional Act) 49, 25 (56), <http://www.bka.de/kriminalwissenschaften/kiforum/kiforum2.html>, 30/01/2010.
- ²³ As far as the police is concerned, police missions abroad are to be mentioned in this regard; for the armed forces e.g. in Austria the assistance mission in Burgenland (this refers to the [ongoing] temporary assistance of the army for border control).
- ²⁴ Keyword: "securitization".
- ²⁵ <http://www.bmlv.gv.at/menu/sipol.shtml>, 10th March 2010. At least some of these lists fall mostly into the scope of responsibility of the Interior Department.
- ²⁶ As members of the Copenhagen School and thus advocates of CSS and an enhanced understanding of security.
- ²⁷ Buzan, B./Waever, O./de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A new Framework for Analysis*, London; <http://www.bka.de/kriminalwissenschaften/kiforum/kiforum2.html>.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ²⁹ Cf. in this regard e.g. the debate and the policies on preventive steps, restriction of personal rights and data protection.
- ³⁰ Weaver, O./Buzan, B./Kelstrup, M./Lemaitre, P. (1993). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen.
- ³¹ Separating the concepts of "internal" and "external" security from each other makes, due to changed environmental conditions and a different security concept in the post Cold War era, no more sense in this form.
- ³² Buzan, B./Waever, O./de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, London, 28, in: O'Neill RAF, P. E. *The European Union and Migration, Security versus Identity?*, *Defence Studies*, 6, 3, 4.

- ³³ O'Neill RAF, P. E. (2006). *The European Union and Migration: Security versus Identity?*, *Defence Studies*, 6: 3, 322–350.
- ³⁴ Cf. Vereinte Nationen Generalversammlung (1994). *Agenda für Entwicklung, Bericht des Generalsekretärs*.
- ³⁵ <http://www.bka.de/kriminalwissenschaften/kiforum/kiforum2.htm>.
- ³⁶ Buzan, B./Waeber, O./de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, London, 24.
- ³⁷ Cf. Ulbert, C./Werthes, S. (Hg.) (2008). *Menschliche Sicherheit. Globale Herausforderungen und regionale Perspektiven*, Baden-Baden. In light of this background, it is particularly interesting to watch the increasing shift of focus (and a parallel shift of funds) of development policy measures over to “peace-securing policies”.
- ³⁸ Of course, scientific methods enable us to define factors that have a subjective impact on the feeling of security, because it is assumed that many of these factors are part of the narrower radius of action of the Interior Department or administrative authorities which are responsible for ensuring and maintaining internal security in a state (key-word: “objective criteria” such as crime rate).
- ³⁹ <http://www.bka.de/kriminalwissenschaften/kiforum/kiforum2.html>, 30/01/2010.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. e.g.: http://www.isip.uni-hamburg.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=34, 10/02/2010.
- ⁴¹ It is, however, to be looked at with some criticism that by the introduction of the term “human security”, the increase of funds for development cooperation to policies/projects for building/maintaining security structures has become possible.
- ⁴² Editor's note: weapons of mass destruction.
- ⁴³ Oxford Research Group: <http://www.commondreams.org/news2006/0613-07.htm>.
- ⁴⁴ Those who promise guaranteeing certain security aspects can generally claim a certain amount of power – with more or less success. Therefore, other actors, in addition to state institutions (NGOs, IOs, parties and stakeholder representatives etc.) also try to take up a security perspective.
- ⁴⁵ Cf. in this regard e.g. Jakubowicz, L. (2009). *Zusammenarbeit der Grenzbehörden nach der EU-Ost-Erweiterung aus österreichischer Perspektive*, 24–46, in: Bornewasser, M. (Hg.) *Grenzüberschreitende polizeiliche Kooperation nach der EU-Ost-Erweiterung*, Greifswald.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. Schwell, A. (2007). *Europa an der Oder. Kooperation von deutschen und polnischen Grenzforschern im europäischen Sicherheitsfeld*, Graduation thesis, submitted in the Europa University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder. Since, however, “things felt” cannot necessarily be influenced by really successful police work, the mass media here enter in their role as opinion makers, a “problematic” position of power assigned to them also by politics and authorities; at the same time, freedom of opinion and media are undoubtedly basic pillars of democracy.
- ⁴⁷ http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~bendrath/Bendrath_Dividuum.rtf. 31/01/2010.
- ⁴⁸ Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and the Asylum in the EU*, London.
- ⁴⁹ Bigo, D. (1994). *The European International Security Field: stakes and rivalries in a new developing area of police intervention*, in: Anderson, M./den Boer, M. (ed.) *Policing across national boundaries*, London, 161–173.
- ⁵⁰ Anderson, M./Den Boer, M. et al. (1995). *Policing the European Union*, Oxford.
- ⁵¹ Apart from the previously described field of securitization of migration.
- ⁵² Bauböck, R. (2004). *Migration und innere Sicherheit*, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, Vol. 33 (1), 49–66.
- ⁵³ This is based on Austria, but the situation in other countries is likely to be similar.
- ⁵⁴ Cf. e.g.: Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, New York. With the central message of the treatise itself also being the target of political instrumentalization and following particular interpretative rules of game since 2001, cf.: http://www.welt.de/politik/article94681/Warum_der_Kampf_der_Kulturen_noch_Jahrzehnte_dauert.html, 08/03/2010.

- ⁵⁵ Pilgram, A. (2003). *Migration and Internal Security*, in: Fassmann, H./Stacher, I. (ed.) *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht, Klagenfurt*, 306 f.
- ⁵⁶ *At this point, the discourse-related correlation between the transnationalism concept and the issue of organized crime also becomes obvious.*
- ⁵⁷ *Verification/falsification of certain theses as illustrated is still outstanding and is also not intended to be the subject of this paper. Such an endeavour is, on the one hand, not possible in this form based on the data available and, on the other hand, the analysis of either item would be a sufficient subject a matter for a research paper of its own.*
- ⁵⁸ Bauböck, R. (2004). *Migration und innere Sicherheit*, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, Vol. 33 (1), 49.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁰ *Frequently described as “crimes without victims”; cf. Bauböck, R. (2004). Migration und innere Sicherheit, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 33 (1), 53.*
- ⁶¹ *Keyword: “boat people” or the notorious USA-Mexico border.*
- ⁶² *In this regard, introduction of balancing steps – i.e. shifting control away from the border – has proved its worth from the point of view of Austria.*
- ⁶³ *Interview with Federal Minister Maria Fekter, Republik. Das unabhängige Magazin für Führungskräfte im öffentlichen Bereich (January/February 2010), 17.*
- ⁶⁴ Bauböck, R. (2004). *Migration und innere Sicherheit*, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, Vol. 33 (1), 51.
- ⁶⁵ *Cf. e.g. KIRAS (2009). Projektendbericht SALOMON Next Step, Bedrohungswahrnehmungen von MigrantInnen. Eine Studie im Rahmen der österreichischen Sicherheitsforschung, Wien.*
- ⁶⁶ *Cf. Dietrich, H. (1999). Feindbild „Illegale“. Eine Skizze zu Sozialtechnik und Grenzregime, in: Dominik, K. et al. (Hg.) Angeworben, eingewandert, abgeschoben. Ein anderer Blick auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Münster, 290–323; Pilgram, A. (2003). Migration und innere Sicherheit, in: Fassmann, H./Stacher, I. (Hg.) Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht, Klagenfurt, 333.*
- ⁶⁷ Pilgram, A. (2003). *Migration und innere Sicherheit*, in: Fassmann, H./Stacher, I. (ed.) *Österreichischer Migrations- und Integrationsbericht, Klagenfurt*, 333.
- ⁶⁸ *Unfortunately, we may not discuss this issue in more detail here (however, cf. what has been said on securitization).*
- ⁶⁹ *In a closer look, the various levels (micro-level, meso-level, macro-level) would have to be addressed at this point.*
- ⁷⁰ http://www.isip.uni-hamburg.de/index.php?option=com_jdownlads&Itemid=60&task=finish&cid=15&catid=1, 11/02/2010.
- ⁷¹ http://www.isip.uni-hamburg.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=34, 11/02/2010.
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