



Bachhiesl, Christian (2022):

Coat Collar and Trouser Fly. Strategies of suspicion and presumptions of dangerousness in the field of criminal science around 1900

SIAK-Journal – Journal for Police Science and Practice (International Edition Vol. 12), 40-48.

doi: 10.7396/IE_2022_D

Please cite this article as follows:

Bachhiesl, Christian (2022). Coat Collar and Trouser Fly. Strategies of suspicion and presumptions of dangerousness in the field of criminal science around 1900, SIAK-Journal – Journal for Police Science and Practice (International Edition Vol. 12), 40-48, Online: http://dx.doi.org/10.7396/IE_2022_D.

© Federal Ministry of the Interior – Sicherheitsakademie / Verlag Österreich, 2022

Note: A hard copy of the article is available through the printed version of the SIAK-Journal published by Verlag Österreich (<https://www.verlagoesterreich.at/>).

published online: 09/2022

Coat Collar and Trouser Fly

Strategies of suspicion and presumptions of dangerousness in the field of criminal science around 1900



CHRISTIAN BACHHIESL,
*Historian, Ancient Historian and
Jurist, Custodian and Curator
of the Hans Gross Museum of
Criminology, Graz.*

Modern criminal justice and criminal science developed alongside modern statehood. However much these institutions strive for objectivity and emotional distance, the state system of punishment has never got by without suspicions, and suspicions are always associated with presumptions of dangerousness. This article makes use of examples from the early days of criminal science, above all statements made by the Graz criminologist Hans Gross and his colleagues, to show how attempts were made around 1900 to perfect the system of state legitimised strategies of suspicion and how the system was connected with the stigmatisation of deviant and disadvantaged groups, not least those that were already restricted in terms of self-fulfilment, such as women or so-called “gypsies”. This gave rise to the paradox that the state essentially placed every citizen under general suspicion, but expected these “suspects” to place unlimited trust in it and approve its increasing appeals for regulation in ever more areas of life. But how can an institution whose efficiency is based on suspicions awaken trust? And what problems crop up when considering these questions for the discipline of criminal science? The historical analysis reveals how important these questions also are for the situation today, even if history is unable to solve today’s problems. We will have to take care of that ourselves.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the early modern era, criminal law and criminal justice have moved away from grizzly, publicly performed corporal punishments, such as execution by the breaking wheel, beheading or drowning, towards imprisonment and fines that no longer aimed at retaliation, but primarily at prevention, reform and the (re-)integration of delinquents (Evans 2020). The punishments became milder, their purpose more humane, and so it is no wonder that, from an enlightened, modern perspective, so-called progress, a move towards reform can be postulated, one of the many laborious steps in the “process of civilisation” (Elias

1969) that we continue to feel committed to, if one follows the ideological creed of European governments. Admittedly, the punishment of lawbreakers became milder and more rational; but it also became much more efficient and comprehensive, because modern states determined and still determine the life of their citizens to an ever-increasing extent and in more detail; one could also say: more ruthlessly, resulting in that part of life that can be shaped by custom, belief, habit or private autonomy shrinking ever further. From the 19th century to today, the legal instruments of power of the state have been joined in an ever-expanding way by the so-called

“science” (and the forms of criminal science that became institutionalised around 1900 are also to be allocated to this collective singular), which does its part to ensuring people’s lives are determined by others. The increasingly intensive normative compulsion is joined, so to speak, by the epistemological compulsion; it is therefore possible to speak not only of progress in the sense of humanisation and the guarantee of increasing security, but also of an advancing loss of freedom and a reduction in the freedom to shape one’s own life. We were taught to look at it in this way by Michel Foucault, who laid down one of the central elements of the modernisation process in “*Surveiller et punir*” (Foucault 1977). Foucault and his adherents generally do not see the modernisation of criminal law, the establishment of scientifically legitimised disciplinary bodies such as psychiatry, or the development of statehood as being a story of success, but rather one of loss: “The efficiency of the police increased dramatically, the number of violent crimes declined, and the state began to regulate and control the behaviour of its citizens with a degree of thoroughness never seen before. The principle of equality before the law reduced everyone to a status where they could become the object of the new, classifying sciences, such as psychiatry or criminology” (Evans 2020, 39). Admittedly, one does not have to view the “power grab” of modern statehood as negatively as Foucault does; however, we want to avoid getting into a discussion here about whether modernisation is mostly something good or has changed the world for the worse (for the genesis of the modern era and for its light and dark sides cf. Taylor 2009), especially as it is easy to slip into ridiculousness, as happens, for example, in the film “*Monty Python’s Life of Brian*”, where the question of the resistance fighter Rech: “All right, but apart from the sanita-

tion, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and public health, what have the Romans EVER done for us?” is answered with: “Brought peace,” which in turn is countered with: “Oh. Peace? Shut up!” (Members 2003). If one examines more closely the way in which Rome spread its peace across the world, this response does not appear at all apodictic as it does at first sight (cf. James 2013; Mainz 2017; Sommer 2013, 296–302; Dahlheim 2015).

However, what we want to establish in the Foucaultish sense is the fact that the increasing effectiveness of modern criminal justice is based not only on rationalisation and scientification, but on a dispositive that is critical to the functioning of the security-generating apparatus: suspicion. A permeation of life with law-abiding behaviour and security that embraces all of society is dependent on a basic attitude of always being alert to suspicion. Because what is evident does not first have to be determined, brought to the light of day and brought to justice. Criminal law and the criminal science that supports it are mechanisms fuelled by suspicion. They serve, as Richard Evans says summarising Foucault, “a new, diffuse economy of power and knowledge, in which the prison itself became a model for society as a whole and everyone monitored one other: everyone monitored and disciplined one other and ultimately themselves” (Evans 2020, 39).

We now want to look more closely below at what exactly the suspicion strategies, which always went hand-in-hand with presumptions of dangerousness, looked like in the field of criminal science in the years around 1900. The focus will be on the Austrian criminologist Hans Gross, who can be considered one of the founding figures of this discipline (Bachhiesl et al. 2015; Bachhiesl 2012), and on the

“encyclopaedic criminology” that he founded (Göppinger 1980, 1).

2. ADDICTION TO SUSPICION

People are suspicious, suspicious! And always dangerous. One must therefore look them straight in the eyes, leave nothing unturned, nothing may remain beyond suspicion when the detective gets to work. (Criminalistics refers here to the practical solving of crimes, criminology to the theoretical attempts at explaining and the classifying phenomenology of crimes and criminals. Criminal science serves as an umbrella term. The terminology was and is non-uniform in this respect, and even Hans Gross frequently changed how he used it. Cf. Bachhiesl 2012, 24–28.) Hans Gross, a native of Graz who, after many years as an examining magistrate, public prosecutor and criminal judge, found himself at the beginning of his university career as a criminal lawyer and criminologist, summarised his findings in this regard in the work “Criminalpsychologie” (Gross 1898). If one wishes to find out the truth, one must not rely on the words of the suspect; rather one must pay attention to all bodily forms of expression, to gestures, facial expressions, gait, physiognomy, form and posture of the hands, as well as to the type of clothing, because “it is not merely by the shoes, but by each piece of clothing that one discerns the character of the woman, but equally that of the man” (Gross 1898, 101). Admittedly, this requires a precise and careful approach because the necessary basic suspicion should not, of course, result in jumping to conclusions. Only a decent amount of professional experience can sufficiently sharpen the senses of the criminalist – he could then read a woman’s anger or lust from her finger movements (Gross 1898, 129) and conclude the earlier presence of an always thieving, but reliably cowardly so-called “gypsy” from an

odour lingering in a room (Gross 1894, 334). Peter Beck called this training of the attention to all clues and details, which can turn the always latently present and quickly awoken suspicion of the criminalist into a provable certainty, the “practical view” (Becker 2005, 293; *ibid.*, 299), which could also assume the form of a “standardised gaze” (Becker 2001). One could also speak of an investigative gaze, of the incessant search for clues capable of firming up the suspicion (cf. Grube 2007). Countless examples could be cited here to illustrate the sophisticated way in which Hans Gross (and with him all the other grand masters of criminal science, such as Rudolf Archibald Reiss, Edmond Locard and Ernst Gennat) advanced and refined the cultivation of suspicion. However, there is not enough space here for this, and it has anyway already been dealt with extensively elsewhere (Bachhiesl 2015a; *id.* 2015b). We want to look at just one brief example, albeit thoroughly. His “Encyclopaedia of Criminology”, a lexical collection of important keywords for practical criminalists, which was published in the periodical “Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik” established by Gross in 1898, also contains the lemma that forms the title for this article:

“The coat collar and trouser fly is very often the repository for important items of evidence, particularly in vagrants and similar people. The fabric here is thick because there are several layers of it, the trouser fly is also too loathsome to go searching around in, which is why forged papers, false seals, fake money, means of communication, etc. are most often sewn in here (false seals often have their own eyelets for this purpose). These areas (hat lining, hem at the bottom the trouser legs, boot lining and between the soles of the shoes) must be searched on each arrested person, who can only remotely be trusted with such

possession, particularly in the case of all vagrants, who are very often the most dangerous of people” (Gross 1901, 66).

The criminalist suspicion manifests itself here in a big way. It is also important not to overlook the fact that Gross does not work with crude suppositions or abstruse prejudices – the matter is not that simple, and politically motivated historians and critics of criminal science sometimes overlook this. Even if mostly political and ideological motives can be detected behind the attempt of early criminal science to drape a rigidly normative order as seamlessly as possible over society (Hertz/Bachhiesl 2019), statements like those quoted above nevertheless underlie empiricism and deviance that manifests itself in reality. The general suspicion that Hans Gross expresses here against “vagrants and similar people” is, as far as their concrete behaviour such as the practice of hiding objects for unauthorised activities in their clothing is concerned, not plucked out of thin air, but is based on the professional experience of the criminologist – the professional civil servant knows what he has to pay attention to when dealing with enemies of society. But this is precisely where we can identify the point at which the limited suspicion focused on certain offences transforms into a fundamental suspicion: deviants and criminals are not viewed as people who disobey a state order or prohibition, but as asocial, even antisocial subjects, who commit, as they see it, not merely a minor violation of criminal laws, such as vagrancy. Involved here are not law-breaking but essentially sane criminals who are basically to be controlled with the means of criminal justice, such as “scuffling peasants”, “energetic avengers of their honour”, or “some manslaughterers”, but so-called degenerates (cf. Bachhiesl 2012, 114–137). These committed no crime, but “generally only transgressions”, but by virtue of their

degenerate nature are persons who are “extremely dangerous to the existence of the state”. And now it becomes clear why Gross describes the vagrants in the aforementioned quote as “very often the most dangerous people”, because they numbered, like every person “who works only in extreme need”, amongst the degenerates, and the state lacked the necessary means to proceed against them: “We cannot lock away the vagrants, professional players, sexual perverts, carriers of disease, etc. for their entire life, even though they are more harmful to society than those who have committed a so-called serious crime just once in their life and certainly never will again” (Gross 1908a, 71). For “simple degenerates” (i.e. all those who do not suffer from psychopathic forms of degeneration), as they would be embodied by vagrants, Gross proposed their removal from society, i.e. deportation, because for the degenerates this is “the only remedy, for society the only imaginable protection” (Gross 1908b, 10). Suspicion of vagrants is therefore not merely aimed at the falsification of seals and documents, against the counterfeiting of money and against the transmission of secret messages, secret symbols and other forbidden forms of communication, these offences are only the symptoms. The suspicion is aimed at the lifestyle of the vagrant and other deviants and marginal groups, because they are like a disease that infects and undermines society as a whole (the biologicistic-organistic reading of the crime already sounds here like a disease afflicting the population, as was to become dominant in the time of National Socialism, cf. Bachhiesl 2008, 25–32), which is what makes it so incredibly dangerous. Suspicion is aimed at everything that does not fit with the state and its bodies’ power to define and interpret. But that is probably only the consequent result of a state structure fundamentally based on

suspicion: the suspicion starts out small and is directed towards ever greater things until, finally, the cosmic order itself is knocked out of balance by the deviant behaviour. This would, despite all modern science and without noticing it, actually move us very close again to the view that motivated law enforcement of the early modern era: that crime and everything deviant not only harms the victims and their relatives, but also offends the religious order – only that the state replaces god here. Perhaps Latour’s catchy phrase: “We have never been modern” should have something of the ring of truth about it (Latour 2008)?

The investigative view of early criminal science was therefore aimed far beyond any individual, concrete suspicion, encompassed the suspicion of all non-state standardised and certified things, and accorded it a precipitous dangerousness. And this mania for suspicion swept up not only criminalists and other servants of the state, but all obedient citizens who wanted to help prevent the destabilisation of the state order. Just a small example might illustrate how normatively determined thinking in conjunction with latent suspiciousness can determine behaviours, even perceptions, all the way to auto-suggestion (Hellwig 1912): the jurist Albert Hellwig, a keen contributor in the “Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik”, who also profiled himself as a specialist in criminal superstition, came under suspicion of smoking against the rules when he used a lift in Berlin. The lift operator – such professions existed at the time; the best we can hope for today is talking elevators – informed him that the entire lift smelled of cigarette smoke and so he should put the cigarette out.

When Hellwig truthfully assured him that he wasn’t smoking, the lift operator argued with him a little while longer, and only when the jurist held a “slip of

paper rolled up like a cigarette” under the other’s nose “did he pull a very silly face and apologise”. For Hellwig, the matter was quickly explained: the lift operator had seen the slip of paper half hidden in his hand and taken it to be a half-concealed cigarette, and this optical illusion gave rise to an “olfactory illusion”. It is very instructive for criminalists “to note the creation of a sensory illusion”, said Hellwig, and so he told this highly irrelevant story to the expert audience. One can also see this episode as an example of the effectiveness of suspicion ordered by the authorities, which may well cause discomfort in the few remaining upstanding smokers. Because smoking has since largely been put out of business, to the benefit of public health. In the same way that proximity between people has also recently fallen under suspicion, also for health reasons, this time with a viral connotation. Because, of course, the state wants its citizens to be healthy. And it wants them to trust it.

3. CRAVING TRUST

The state necessarily expects its citizens to trust it because it has monopolised the key elements for the creation of social order, so that it alone may create this order. This applies first and foremost to public safety, criminal justice and everything to do with the use of force in this context. There has long since been no legitimate space for family or clan justice, secret courts, justice by lynching or feuding. The state monopoly on the use of force creates stable peace and security, especially legal certainty, and a modern community can only thrive under these conditions. The freedoms and creative spaces that people lose in the process are small compared to the advantages they obtain from ceding large parts of their sovereignty to act. (There are, however, people, mainly in the USA, who claim that a free citizen can only be truly free when

they are allowed to bear arms, but we do not live in the Wild West in this country.) It was Cesare Beccaria, one of the icons of enlightened criminal law reform in the 18th century, who stated that the “evils that grow out of the enlightenment”, are in an “inverse relationship to their distribution, but the advantages in proportion to it.” Viewed in this way, nobody should actually have any objections to the state’s monopoly over power: “That is why there are no enlightened people who do not love public, clear and useful contracts for maintaining general security by comparing the small, unnecessary part of the freedom sacrificed by them with the sum of the freedom sacrificed by all other people, who could conspire against them without the existing laws being in place. Anyone who takes a rational look at a collection of well-written laws and finds that he has only lost the noxious freedom to harm others will feel forced to bless the throne and its occupant.” (Beccaria 1905, 164 f). The throne and its occupant are what we currently call the state, and at the time of Hans Gross it was called state power, only there was increasingly less willingness among certain sections of the population (the deviants, indeed) around 1900 and among ever larger sections of the population nowadays to bless this or to simply approve of it without reservation. Because in order to be able to do that, one would have to trust the state. But how can one trust an institution whose entire ambition lies in distrusting its own citizens as comprehensively as possible and in being suspicious of them? Of course, says the state, it is only suspicious of those who arouse suspicion. But is that really the case? Has that always been perceived thus? We attempted above to show that general suspicion was (and is) a constitutive feature in the establishment of modern criminal justice and in the enforcement of an efficient security policy.

And the fact that the state increasingly distrusts its citizens can also be seen outside of criminal law in some areas; one only has to think of mandatory cash registers or of state-sponsored, even forced digitalisation (with all its wonderful options for control and monitoring), which now evokes redemption fantasies with a religious character, as it were, which is why the unbridled rush towards digitalisation has probably been described quite fittingly as “worship” and “super-ideology” (Wolff 2020). Indeed, digitalisation might lead to the mental and moral atrophy of humankind, with the result that it heralds the beginning of a “new dark age” (Bridle 2020) more than the arrival of the binary nirvana invoked by all sides, including the state – and the person mutates into a mere app of his so appropriately called “terminal devices”. Those who don’t wish to participate in digitalisation find it almost impossible to participate in public life, and are always suspicious. (For example, a criminal police officer in Vienna once described the author of this text, though probably only half-jokingly, as being very suspicious when told he did not own a mobile phone.) And what we are experiencing by way of suspicion in the ongoing so-called coronavirus crisis probably staggers many people: the tracking experts are attempting in vain to trace dangerous persons and superspreaders, the government is seeking in vain to reconcile extensive monitoring with the human and civilian rights that still have to be observed, the state is suspicious of Covid deniers, who in turn suspect the state, the conspiracy theorists in any case suspect everything that contradicts their theories or better theorems, and perfectly normal citizens suspect one another. With so many suspicions and with all the sometimes drastic measures and social distancing that combating the virus entails, it is understandable that the German criminologist

Michael Bock suggests thinking about a “society in open enforcement” (Bock 2020).

But we don’t want to deal with this any further, we want to cast our gaze back to the time around 1900. Because even then, the state wanted to do good deeds for its citizens and thus create order and security. For this, it required the trust of its citizens, and the citizens were, apart from a few anarchical crazies, fundamentally prepared to give the state their trust. Admittedly, the all-suspicious state wanting to be trusted is a paradox, but that is what it is about. The state demanded that its citizens trusted it, and they mostly did, although the suspicion always exists that some did not. And so the state did not trust its citizens. For a long time, it did not even trust its bodies, which had to suspect all others.

Thus legal rules of evidence survived in Austria into the 1870s that were binding on the judges and also laid out the reasons for suspicion that the judges had to follow (Articles 138–140 and 278–281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Strafprozessordnung, StPO] of 1853); only in the last quarter of the 19th century did the free consideration of evidence we are familiar with achieve its breakthrough, meaning that the judges were themselves able to shape their suspicions and convictions regarding guilt and innocence. (The legal rules of evidence and grounds for suspicion and their power in shaping criminal proceedings were vividly presented in Gross 1900.) And once the grounds for evidence could be freely elicited, one needed science, criminal science in fact, which best of all focused methodically on the exact natural sciences, in order to attain the highest possible degree of certainty (assuming that certainty can be graduated at all). But, oh dear, the criminal scientists for their part sometimes did not trust their own suspicions and warned against being too keen to make the crime

an arrestable offence. So it was, as Paul Näcke, a keen colleague on Hans Grossen’s periodical “Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik”, notes, for example, praiseworthy when, as a criminologist, one received information about sexual deviance, but one had to ensure that this information did not “strike a high moral chest note”, because then the suspicion would exist that the informers, if they were women, would be “onanists”, which would invalidate the information because: “Morally dragged down by excessive masturbation, it is refreshing for them to incite and smear other, happy people because they themselves feel unhappy” (Näcke 1910, 183). Are onanists really unhappier and therefore more defamatory than other people? And why is the suspicion limited to female onanists? As always, suspicion is shifted from one group of people to others, that is its nature. Nevertheless, the suspicion of one’s own suspicion can perhaps bring about a certain degree of protection against hasty condemnation.

4. CODA

What happens, however, if, contrary to the state’s expectations, citizens do not trust the state because they are suspicious of it? Does it force people to trust it, if necessary with the means available to it in criminal law? Do all doubters of the state also reject the state? Or is the state satisfied with being obeyed, whether trusted or not? Can such a society, such a state, whose citizens do not identify with it, function for the long term? This brings to mind the catchphrase of the so-called coercive state of late antiquity, which allegedly increasingly censored and suppressed its citizens, so that they were ultimately happy when it collapsed. However, “the despotism of the Roman emperors [was] not at all wrapped up in the meticulous supervision of all minor matters, with government intervention in absolutely

everything, particularly not with the dictating and controlling of mental trends that adhere to the modern state,” wrote the Basel historian Jacob Burckhardt (Burckhardt 2007, 55; on late antiquity generally, cf. Demandt 1998) in the 19th century. Many say that the modern state is a kind of coercive machine. And yet the liberal democracies are so proud of having achieved more freedom than ever before, precisely with the means of the state, including criminal law and criminal science. But that is precisely the reason for the failure of liberalism, argues the political scientist Patrick J. Deneen: The state enacts freedoms which it then has to implement with force. It destroys all pre-state and non-state regulatory mechanisms, only to then have to take care of everything and everyone itself and guarantee the functioning of the newly invented world (Deneen 2019). And yet we need the state, because otherwise chaos would erupt and the people would go for each other without restraint – so goes an often heard thesis that has some merit to

it, but is rejected by some as a mere “chaos hypothesis” that is unfounded and only an instrument for “propping up the crumbling masonry of western legalism” (de Sutter 2020, 29 f). Is a thriving life without the state really conceivable? And even if one decided to go down that path, people elsewhere would probably stick with the state and its organisational superiority, rendering a stateless idyll defenceless. Or will all states gradually disappear in the same way they came into existence? And what would come after that? These are all questions that criminal science – thank goodness – does not have to answer. But how criminality can be avoided and contained is something it most likely does have to think about. As is the question of whether all-embracing suspicion is the right way to achieve this goal, and the question of how the trust necessary for happy coexistence is to be encouraged. Because no state can be made solely by being suspicious of every coat collar and trouser fly.

Sources of information

- Bachhiesl, Christian (2008). *Das Verbrechen als Krankheit. Zur Pathologisierung eines strafrechtlichen Begriffs, Virus – Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der Medizin* (7), 11–40.
- Bachhiesl, Christian (2012). *Zwischen Indizienparadigma und Pseudowissenschaft. Wissenschaftshistorische Überlegungen zum epistemischen Status kriminalwissenschaftlicher Forschung*, Wien/Berlin.
- Bachhiesl, Christian (2015a). *Hans Gross findet die Wahrheit. Zur kriminalwissenschaftlichen Wahrheitsgewinnung um 1900*, in: Bachhiesl, Christian et al. (Eds.), *Psychoanalyse & Kriminologie. Hans & Otto Gross – Libido und Macht. 8. Internationaler Otto Gross Kongress, Graz, 14. bis 16. Oktober 2011, Marburg a.d. Lahn*, 147–174.
- Bachhiesl, Christian (2015b). *Über die Verwandlung von Werten in Wissen. Wahrheitsstreben und Wertungen in der Kriminalwissenschaft um 1900*, in: Friedrich, Hans-Edwin/Ort, Claus-Michael (Eds.), *Recht und Moral. Zur gesellschaftlichen Selbstverständigung über „Verbrechen“ vom 17. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 285–299.
- Bachhiesl, Christian et al. (Eds.) (2015). *Hans Gross – ein ‚Vater‘ der Kriminalwissenschaft. Zur 100. Wiederkehr seines Todestages*, Wien.
- Beccaria, Cesare (1905). *Über Verbrechen und Strafen. Übersetzt, mit biographischer Einleitung und Anmerkungen versehen von Karl Esselborn*, Leipzig.
- Becker, Peter (2001). *The Standardized Gaze: The Standardization of the Search Warrant in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, in: Caplan, Jane/Torpey, John (Eds.) *Documenting Individual Identity. The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, Princeton/Oxford, 139–163.

- Becker, Peter (2005). Zwischen Tradition und Neubeginn: Hans Gross und die Kriminologie und Kriminalistik der Jahrhundertwende, in: Götz von Olenhusen, Albrecht/Heuer, Gottfried (Eds.), *Die Gesetze des Vaters*, 4. Internationaler Otto Gross Kongress, Graz, 24. bis 26. Oktober 2003, Marburg a.d. Lahn, 290–309.
- Bock, Michael (2020). Die Gesellschaft im offenen Vollzug. Kriminologische Überlegungen zum Lockdown, *Archiv für Kriminologie* (246), 194–206.
- Bridle, James (2020). *New Dark Age. Der Sieg der Technologie und das Ende der Zukunft*, München.
- Burckhardt, Jacob (2007). *Das Geschichtswerk, Die Zeit Constantins des Großen*, Frankfurt a.M.
- Dahlheim, Werner (2015). *Die Welt zur Zeit Jesu*, München.
- de Sutter, Laurent (2020). *Nach dem Gesetz*, Berlin.
- Demandt, Alexander (1998). *Geschichte der Spätantike. Das Römische Reich von Diocletian bis Justinian 284–565 n. Chr.*, München.
- Deneen, Patrick J. (2019). *Warum der Liberalismus gescheitert ist*, Salzburg/Wien.
- Elias, Norbert (1969). *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. I. Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes. II. Wandlungen der Gesellschaft. Entwurf zu einer Theorie der Zivilisation*, Bern.
- Evans, Richard J. (2020). *Rituale der Vergeltung. Die Todesstrafe in der deutschen Geschichte 1532–1987*, Darmstadt.
- Foucault, Michel (1977). *Überwachen und Strafen. Die Geburt des Gefängnisses*, Frankfurt a.M.
- Göppinger, Hans (1980). *Kriminologie*, München.
- Gross, Hans (1894). *Handbuch für Untersuchungsrichter, Polizeibeamte, Gendarmen u.s.w.* (2), Graz.
- Gross, Hans (1898). *Criminalpsychologie*, Graz.
- Gross, Hans (1900). *Der Raubmord an Johann Saubart*, *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik*, Bd. 5, 55–101.
- Gross, Hans (1901). *Encyclopädie der Kriminalistik*, *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik*, Bd. 6, 1–96.
- Gross, Hans (1908a). *Degeneration und Deportation*, in: Hans Gross (Ed.), *Gesammelte Kriminalistische Aufsätze*, Bd. 2, Leipzig, 70–77.
- Gross, Hans (1908b). *Die Degeneration und das Strafrecht*, in: Hans Gross (Ed.), *Gesammelte Kriminalistische Aufsätze*, Bd. 2, Leipzig, 1–11.
- Grube, Gernot (2007). ‚abfährten‘ – ‚arbeiten‘. *Investigative Erkenntnistheorie*, in: Krämer, Sibylle et al. (Eds.), *Spur. Spurenlesen als Orientierungstechnik und Wissenskunst*, Frankfurt a.M., 222–253.
- Hellwig, Albert (1912). *Kriminalistische Abhandlungen*, *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik*, Bd. 50, 1–23.
- Hertz, Gal/Bachhiesl, Christian (2019). *Hans Gross und die Normativität der kriminalistischen Wahrheitsfindung*, *myops* (35), 34–43.
- James, Simon (2013). *Rom und das Schwert. Wie Krieger und Waffen die römische Geschichte prägten*, Darmstadt.
- Latour, Bruno (2008). *Wir sind nie modern gewesen. Versuch einer symmetrischen Anthropologie*, Frankfurt a.M.
- Manz, Gunnar (2017). *Roms Aufstieg zur Weltmacht. Das Zeitalter der Punischen Kriege*, Wiesbaden.
- Members (2003). *Textbuch des Monty-Python's-Films „Das Leben des Brian“*, Online: www.members.teleweb.at/wo/das_leben_des_brian.htm (17.01.2003). Diese Internetseite ist nicht mehr aktiv, der zitierte Text wurde am 17. Jänner 2003 ausgedruckt. Der englische Text ist nachzulesen unter http://montypython.50webs.com/Life_of_Brian.htm (02.07.2021).
- Näcke, Paul (1910). *Kleinere Mitteilungen. 4. Sexuelle Verdächtigungen durch Onanistinnen*, *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik*, Bd. 39, 181–185.
- Sommer, Michael (2013). *Römische Geschichte. Erster Band: Rom und die antike Welt bis zum Ende der Republik*, Stuttgart.
- Taylor, Charles (2009). *Ein säkulares Zeitalter*, Frankfurt a.M.
- Wolff, Marie-Luise (2020). *Die Anbetung. Über eine Superideologie namens Digitalisierung*, Frankfurt a.M.