Tränkle, Stefanie/Herzbach, Dirk (2018):

The Anger of the Police. The French National Police – both heroised and hated by the French population


doi: 10.7396/IE_2018_C

Please cite this article as follows:


© Federal Ministry of the Interior – Sicherheitsakademie / NWV, 2018

Note: A hard copy of the article is available through the printed version of the SIAK-Journal published by NWV (http://nwv.at).

published online: 9/2018
The Anger of the Police

The French National Police – both heroised and hated by the French population

Thousands of police officers from the National Police have been demonstrating on the streets for weeks. This article examines where the anger of the security forces originates from and embeds the current events in an analysis of the relationship between the citizenry and the state power. Police work in France is currently in a perpetual state of emergency, among other things in connection with counter-terrorism, which is putting an extreme strain on human resources. This work is further burdened by an ambivalent relationship between the National Police and the population; the security forces are experiencing heroisation as well as hatred, manifesting itself in mutual violence. The article outlines why a rapprochement between the population and the police hardly seems in sight beyond short-term solidarity effects after attacks due to political and social circumstances on the one hand and internal structures on the other.

1. INTRODUCTION

Masked with scarves or paper masks, they block the streets with motor vehicles, hold the tricolours high and sing the French national anthem: “To arms, citizens!” (“Aux arms, citoyens”), says the text of the Marseillaise. French officers of the National Police are conducting partly unannounced demonstrations throughout the country. The reason for this was an attack which took place in October 2016 in Greater Paris at a crossroads known as a high-crime area. Molotov cocktails were thrown into two patrol cars and the officers were prevented from getting out for so long that two of them could only escape at the last minute with life-threatening injuries and two with less serious injuries.

What interests are being pursued with these demonstrations? The T-shirts and banners of the demonstrators demand: “Nous voulons protection et reconnaissance” (we want protection and recognition). The protection they are protesting about is meant on the one hand in the figurative sense in the form of support by superiors, and on the other, as actual health protection in the form of better protective equipment. One young officer, who works in one of the suburbs with extremely high crime rates, told us that procuring safety equipment at his own expense was “normal”: “They give us white gloves for the dress uniform, but helmets to protect us when stones are being thrown at us are often lacking.”

Interestingly, the anger is directed at the populace on one hand and at their own superiors and the judiciary on the other. Demands are being made by frustrated emergency personnel above all for consistency in law enforcement and punishment measures. An appeal is being made to the
populace not to attack the emergency services in order not to jeopardise their ability to protect the public.

The malaise is not a new phenomenon, but in 2016 multiple stresses culminated in a frustration that is now being released in the demonstrations: the extremely high workload as a result of the “Vigipirate” system (increased alertness and permanent presence of the emergency forces in public spaces within the framework of counter-terrorism) has to be managed in addition to resource-intensive, large-scale operations (European Football Championship, weeks-long demonstrations against a labour law reform). The level of organisation of the demonstrations is still numerically low, but the interests are being bundled together: the “Mouvement des policiers en colère” (Movement of angry police officers) is an association that was founded in November 2016 out of disappointment with police trade unions. The movement, initially regionally independent, united in January 2017 to form UPNI – Union des policiers nationaux indépendants (Association of independent police officers of the National Police).2

Despite a strike and a partial demonstration ban, police officers are not afraid of raising public awareness about their grievances. In 2016, many police officers resigned their investigative authorisation (OPJ – officier de police judicaire)3 to protest against the judiciary’s decision-making practice, which they perceive as a lack of support.4 One of the old topics of the traditional police trade unions is to condemn the high recruitment rate, the alleged failure of prevention policy and the consequences of a lack of enforcement of penalties. The police are tired of repeatedly arresting the same people who would soon be released again (Jobard 2016a, 4).5 Many feel unrepresented by the police trade unions, and the newly founded UPNI is explicitly different to them.

There is also another side: the French police received gratitude and admiration following the attacks in 2015 and 2016. The courageous intervention of the emergency services in the terrorist attacks became a heroic narrative, for example with regard to the first patrol who arrived to the scene of the bombing of the Bataclan music club and fought the offenders with only pistols and light protective vests or the officers who shot the lorry bomber in Nice to stop him. The two police officers who fell victim to a targeted double murder at their place of residence are also honoured and mourned as heroes. The terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016 led to a rapid and partly patriotically motivated increase6 in the number of applicants.7 However, the effect of solidarity between the populace and the police remains situational; as the topicality of the events abates, the resentments of the populace are surfacing again, whilst in the political arena, the national unity invoked after the attacks is dissolving into debates about responsibility and recriminations.

When asked about the paradox that a large number of French people consider the police demonstrations justified, while at the same time, the police have been the target of violent attacks for years, police researcher de Maillard8 answers in a radio interview: “There is a very ambivalent relationship between the populace and the police: They are loved when they protect us and condemned when they proceed to prosecute us.”9 The French’s attachment to the police in 2015 was sincere, but failed to resolve the mistrust that had existed for decades in a large proportion of the population, for whom the police have a brutal image, said Jobard (Jobard 2016b, 1) in his analysis on the “hatred of the cops” (“la haine anti-flics”). Despite the situational solidarity effect between the police and the populace, the relationship between the French citizenry and the security forces,
above all the National Police, has been
tense, if not hostile, for decades.\textsuperscript{10}

This paper considers the origin of the anger with which the police officers are demonstrating: What impelled police officers to take to the streets? What does this say about the current situation of the National Police and how can it be explained? To this end, we look at what current events are shaping daily working life, especially what the ongoing threat of terrorism\textsuperscript{11} means for the police, but also the still socially and politically unsolved problems for which the police are a “lightning rod”. Our thesis is that in addition to the situational and structural social factors, the problems are also “homemade”; therefore, we conclude by drawing attention to the self-image of the police and the resulting operational routines which foster distance, mistrust and violence between police and citizenry. On the one hand, this article is based on the insights by the team of authors obtained in the course of many years of professional contact with the French police. In addition, the French media landscape is observed through the eyes of the police and made accessible to the readers. These impressions are embedded into current French police-sociological research, although given the topicality of the events and the fundamentally difficult access to the field, the state of research is only rudimentary. The selectivity and subjectivity of our description of the situation should also be mentioned: this is not only the view of a scientifically oriented police officer and a criminologist, police lecturer and romance philologist on her French colleagues, but also the German view of its neighbouring country, France. We focus mainly on the National Police, which due to its jurisdiction in towns of more than 25,000 inhabitants, is structurally more in confrontation with the populace than the “Gendarmerie Nationale”.

2. POLICE WORK IN A PERMANENT STATE OF EMERGENCY

2.1 Police work in a state of emergency

The current situation of the National Police is characterised above all by the imposition of the state of emergency, which was declared and consequently prolonged as a result of the ongoing threat posed by Islamic terrorism\textsuperscript{12} after the attacks of November 2015; there is no end in sight. This instrument is controversial from the legal perspective, however, there does not appear to be much social discourse about it. One of the few critics argues that the state of emergency is led by an artificial and misleading dichotomy of freedom and security, and security has been chosen. The author warns against simple binary thought patterns which would conceal the fact that the state of emergency would provide an apparent national security, but would be abused by security forces for criminal prosecution in other offences to prosecute petty criminals. The restriction of fundamental civil rights creates legal uncertainty and enables arbitrariness.\textsuperscript{13} In everyday service, this leads to an extreme use of and burden on the security forces.

What does the state of emergency mean with regard to police intervention powers? First of all, security forces have the possibility to search homes without a court order at any time of day or night as part of the so-called administrative investigations (perquisitions administratives)\textsuperscript{14}, namely in suspected cases in all fields of criminal activity (there were already 4,500 searches in December 2016)\textsuperscript{15}. In addition, police security measures may be ordered or carried out: for example, dispersal, reporting obligations (restrictions on local or temporal freedom of movement, house arrest), restrictions on or prohibition of events or the seizure of registered firearms.

In everyday service, the declaration of a state of emergency now means nothing
more than being permanently “on the march”. Visible presence is of great importance in France. Thus, all available forces were mobilised, which in concrete terms means that all organisational units, including those responsible for training and further education, were obliged to send forces for general monitoring and presence deployments. As the security forces are already employed for migration matters and terrorist attacks, the military is being deployed domestically. As part of the “Sentinelle” operation, which was established after the November attacks and extended after the Nice attack, 10,000 soldiers support the police forces to demonstrate their presence in public streets and squares. In order to relieve the military forces, France wishes to build up a national guard in the next few years, which would provide 84,000 reservists. To give an idea of the proportions, this corresponds to roughly one-third of the two police organisations’ bodies of personnel (National Police and National Gendarmerie) put together.

Psychosocial burdens on an individual level due to coping with attacks and violent clashes occur as a result of the workload. A centre specialising in “post-attack syndromes” has now been established for trauma treatment and suicide prevention amongst emergency personnel.

The police as an organisation is under high media pressure. Security measures (e.g. on the national holiday in Nice) of the police or the intervention of the emergency services in the event of attacks are criticised as insufficient and scandalised, the fragmentation of the police units into many areas of responsibility requires justification. Our impression is that criticism of the executive powers is omnipresent in the media.

As an interim conclusion, it should be noted that police work in France has been in a perpetual state of emergency since 2015, which is putting an extreme strain on human resources.

2.2 The executive powers as a “lightning rod” of social conflict

The burdens due to the terrorist threats have to be overcome in addition to everyday work, which requires the riot police units in particular, but also those of the border guard. A series of major events and special deployment situations means more than a high demand on personnel resources. In the summer of 2016, the demonstrations against the labour law and the European Football Championship were accompanied by weeks of protracted riots characterised by mutual violence. Situational heroisation after attacks and deep-seated hatred on the part of some elements of the populace are closely connected.

A young officer described the current situation to the authors of this article using the comment “c’est la guerre civile” (such is civil war). The police, for their part, are also criticised for their brutal enforcement of measures: as soon as the cameras swung away, brutality would prevail (see Jobard 2016a, 3).

In addition to the occasional major situations, there is the need to manage persistent social problem areas: the conditions described as inhumane in the refugee camps in the port town of Calais, where thousands of people were staying in the hope of being able to enter England illegally, even after several clearance operations, are being monitored by the border guard units of the police (PAF). Internal sources reported that there were about a hundred arrests per night prior to the dissolution of the camps. The arrests (garde à vue) took place mostly due to violent offences of the predominantly male camp inhabitants against each other and against the emergency services, as well as due to drug offences. However, as these usually remained without criminal
consequences, frustration and the impression of powerlessness and hopelessness in terms of being able to control the number of crime occurrences spread amongst the emergency personnel.

The deprived districts on the suburbs of large cities, also known as “banlieues”, are also rife with unsolved social problems that condense regionally. In the autumn of 2005, the banlieues became synonymous with violent riots, deprivation and segregation in residential districts on the outskirts of major French cities, where the architectural structure can already be considered as a form of structural violence. An inspection of one of these districts in Greater Paris in the spring of 2015 accompanied by police – all in plain clothes and with concealed protective equipment – brought about the uncomfortable experience of being identified as “strangers” and threatened by a long stabbing weapon pointed out of a window: “This is our district here, get lost”, is what it meant. A serious examination of the social problems and their possible consequences, for example the radicalisation processes, is not desired on the political level. An analysis of the relationships, such as between social ills in the suburbs and terrorism, is rejected on the grounds that we should not be looking for “excuses”. This has a long tradition: “comprendre, c’est déjà excuser” (understanding is already excusing), this was said years ago by the Ministry of the Interior, which is not exactly open to science, to denounce the superfluity, even the danger of socio-scientific explanatory approaches (see Mouhanna 2011, 144).

Nevertheless, the reality of life, especially for young people often characterised as immigrant but with French citizenship, are still current issues.

Therefore, a decade later, not much has changed in the banlieues. Instead, such districts are experiencing the bureaucratic management of their social problems, reflected in the definition of regional special zones and their continual renaming. First of all, so-called ZUS (Zones urbaines sensibles, sensitive urban areas) were defined in order to justify regional special treatment for municipal political efforts and police tactics to maintain or restore security and order. These were then, among other things, renamed “quartiers prioritaires” (priority districts). Currently, there is talk of “NPNRU”. The constant relabelling with incomprehensible acronyms, which are not listed in full here, expresses the fact that sustainable municipal and police handling of these districts does not yet seem to have been found. For the police, from a tactical point of view, this means that they assume a constant acute threat to the deployed forces. Many a politically motivated attempt to realise citizen-friendly strategies has been implemented locally, wherein the foot patrols, which express closeness to ordinary people, are basically accompanied by a group vehicle for the patrolling officers’ protection.

The police are also criticised for their practice of repeated and selective identity checks without specific cause. These checking practices are perceived by those who are subjected to them as harassing and discriminatory and seem to contribute to the perpetuation of the spirals of violence between the police and the populace.

3. WHY ARE MEMBERS OF THE POLICE DEMONSTRATING AND NOT THE GENDARMERIE?
Patrol cars in flames and scandalous police behaviour – our impression is that this is
not a general problem of the French police but of the National Police mainly operating in the cities. Why is it that the officers of the police are those who are demonstrating? Gendarmerie officers are also heavily involved in counter-terrorism activities, and their riot police units are also deployed in demonstrations and high-risk football matches, and they have no qualms about their equipment (ranged weapons) and tactical approach — yet it is primarily the police (in particular their riot police units, the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité [CRS]) who are known and criticised for their “robust actions”, a police euphemism for rigorous, uncompromising crackdowns. Based on polls, the popularity rating and the confidence on the part of the populace is generally higher for the gendarmerie than for the police.

Why are the officers of the police denied the respect and recognition from the populace which they are demanding in the demonstrations? According to our thesis, this has, among other things, structural reasons that lie within the organisation and distribution of responsibilities within the French security structure, as outlined below.

The peculiarity of French security work is that there are two police forces, whose body of personnel is approximately the same size: the National Police and the National Gendarmerie. Both units basically have all organisational units, from the constabulary and the criminal investigation department to traffic and special units, etc., each with its own infrastructure (situation centres, forensics, etc.). The rule of thumb is that the gendarmerie has jurisdiction in rural areas and the police in the cities. Different services come into play with the geographical jurisdiction. The police handle a large proportion of the crime arising, while the gendarmerie covers about 95% of the territory in terms of surface area and is responsible for half of the populace, but deals with a relatively low crime rate due to the area’s rural nature. However, the two police forces are separated by more than local jurisdiction: ranks, organisational structure, and even the specific culture and approach to police tasks differ, moreover, gendarmes and police officers wear different uniforms. In addition, the police is only subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, while the gendarmerie only in the context of their duties. The gendarmerie basically has a military status and can therefore also undertake tasks in cases of crisis or war.

The misunderstanding that gendarmes as military personnel act in a “military way” in their police duties may easily occur in this case — but in fact, they are much more citizen-oriented in their way of working and their self-image. Gendarmes see themselves as problem solvers who are permanently in situ. Since they always receive (and are obligated to use) a free official residence for themselves and their families on the grounds of their barracks, they know their populace well. Their children attend the same schools as the children of the families they work with. However, for security reasons, members of the police tend to accept a longer journey to their police department, so that they and their family can live far away from their department and thus not be exposed to hostility in their private lives.

For example, if the gendarmerie patrol duty is called to a neighbourhood dispute, the case is then usually also followed up by them, whereas the police is dissected into various “special units”, such as Central Patrol, BAC and other specialised support units, which work more along the lines of the “fire brigade” principle — extinguish the fire and leave. Gendarmes, on the other hand, have an interest in seeking sustainable solutions to conflicts. For example, if a conflict in a neighbourhood does not
calm down, the gendarmes will be called out of bed again during the night. The regional anchoring of the “rural gendarmes” brings a naturally produced proximity to citizens as they live next-door to them and through their way of dealing with cases. There is significant difference between the “rural gendarmes” and the urban “National Police”.

“Avec nous, les gendarmes” (“come with us, gendarmes), chanted the members of the police at one of the demonstrations as they passed a building secured by the gendarmes. The gendarmes, however, have so far failed to respond to this request – this may be due to the strict military hierarchy they are subject to, but it may also be that they have fewer reasons to demonstrate.

As an interim conclusion, the fact that the relationship to the populace, characterised by distance and hostile distrust and that demonstrating police officers are causing a scandal is predominantly a problem with the urban National Police, and less so with the rural gendarmerie.

4. DISTANCE AND DISTRUST BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE POPULACE

In addition to the structural reasons that rather bring the police into violent confrontation with the populace, there are problems which are expressed in anger and frustration in the demonstrations of the “independent police officers”, which are, however, homemade. Our thesis is that the police itself contributes to its distance from the populace by emphasising repressive elements, hardly considering preventive measures, ending approaches representing citizen-oriented strategies and ultimately contributing to the spiral of violence. This is closely related to the self-image of the National Police. Outlined below is what characterises this, how it affects policing and, in turn, the police’s relationship with the populace.

4.1 Little prevention – approaches of citizen-oriented police strategies peter out

Although there are country-wide prevention approaches which are geared towards the municipalities, prevention councils were already founded in 1983. However, this is less of a concept of local crime prevention, i.e. the police does collaborate with local municipalities, however, it assumes somewhat less preventative tasks, rather seeing itself in the role of preventing crime by repression. An example from the prevention council of the Strasbourg Eurométropole: the heads of the police and the gendarmerie inform the mayors of their remits regarding crimes and activities in such meetings. The beginnings of police prevention work, for example in the area of violence and drug prevention or traffic education in schools, are however, available, but not anchored nationwide and also rather marginal. In contrast to the more common self-image of proximity to citizens, it was not possible to anchor the centrally and bureaucratically prescribed concept of proximity to citizens in the police.

4.2 The self-image of the police is characterised by centralised governance

The fact that the officers who turn against the judiciary and their own superiors in their demonstrations are still holding up tricolours and singing the Marseillaise can be explained by their history. The repressive orientation has historical reasons. The fact that the police is traditionally oriented to keep distance from the populace is also due to the conception not only of the security authorities but of the state as a whole: France is characterised by centralised governance in all administrative areas. This is not only reflected in the organisational structure of the police, but also characterises their self-image. What does centralised governance mean
for the police? The respective central directorates are located in Paris, e.g. the central head offices of the criminal investigation department, the constabulary, the riot police and the border police. These central directorates then branch off at the regional level of the precincts. The advantage of centralised governance is that decisions are passed right through to the rank and file. At the same time, however, this principle also means that sometimes lengthy approval procedures are required for local decisions: “tout passe par Paris” – everything goes through Paris. The units of the riot police (CRS) are generally deployed in other precincts (departements) than their own place of service. So, for example, the units of the Strasbourg-based CRS 37 are more likely to manage the situation during demonstrations or football games in Paris. The reason why long journeys are accepted is, from a French point of view, simple: The units of the riot police are intended to maintain public security and order and the state provides that “fraternisation” through local involvement should be ruled out. Furthermore, this central orientation protecting the state can also be seen now during the police demonstrations; the riot police of the National Gendarmerie, the Mobile Gendarmerie are deployed here. The order is clear here as well. The gendarmerie is protecting “the State” against its national police.

In view of the acute threats of terrorism, there is currently more repression – this is not a change, rather simply a strengthening of previous domestic political procedures. The repressive orientation is traditional, prevention is rather a by-product here. Since time immemorial, policing has been translated primarily as a means of protecting the State, the Republic – the concept of protecting the populace only comes after this (see Mouhanna 2011; Fassin 2011; Tränkle/Herzbach 2012b; Herzbach/Tränkle 2013).

Our conversations with French colleagues point to a completely different socialisation, a lack of understanding regarding German conceptions. In the eyes of our French colleagues, the completely differently structured and equipped prevention units, the anti-conflict team, the concept of being close to the citizen to the extent, for example, practiced in Baden-Württemberg has little to do with policing and is sometimes regarded as naive, sometimes self-endangering and as eroding state power.

How is security work thought of in France? The criminal policy line places repression clearly before prevention. Although there is prevention and some remnants of the so-called “police de proximité” (police with proximity to citizens, the French variant of community policing), this is reserved for the engagement of individuals at the local level. Our police contacts confirm again and again that proximity to citizens did not work and was therefore abolished. Our thesis, however, is that the concept of proximity to citizens, as implemented from the 1970s, did not fail, but that it was applied in a too isolated and sporadic way, and could not be reflected in self-image. Foot patrols, for example remained as isolated measures which were unable to be sufficiently effective to improve the relationship with the populace (see Mouhanna 2011; Tränkle/Herzbach 2012a; Herzbach/Tränkle 2013).

4.3 Increasing militarisation of the police

Instead of citizen-friendly and preventative policies of policing, the police are pursuing an armament rationale which Jobard (Jobard 2016b) pointedly describes as a thesis on the increasing militarisation of the police: “The police handling of the demonstrations against the labour market reform laws of 2016, not only at very large gatherings but also in the case of small processions, demonstrated over-equipped
and over-armed police (with weapons with rubber bullets that are not allowed at demonstrations in other countries), seemingly beyond the reach of any judgement” (Jobart 2016b, 2).

The police sees itself less as a community police force, rather as a regulatory force. This is evident, for example, in operational tactics: direct and de-escalating communication with protesters is not planned. Equipment and outward appearance also signal this self-image as a force for order. The conversion from the uniform to cargo pants, a polo shirt and robust combat boots that took place a few years ago highlights this rather military appearance (see also Fassin 2011). Much emphasis is placed during police training on elements that demonstrate and express power, that the police also represent the State: weekly flag salutes, marching and intensive training for the mission type “maintien de l’ordre” (maintenance of public order, convenience translation).

5. CONCLUSION
In summary, the current situational (European Championship, labour law demonstrations, etc.) and more fundamental social problem areas (terrorism, banlieues) represent an immense workload for all French security forces. Critical attention from the media and persistent areas of conflict with its own, primarily young, urban populace are an additional burden for the police.

The National Police is – due to its regional jurisdiction in the cities, more than the National Gendarmerie – the lightning rod of social crises. In addition, we argue that the current situation is homemade, in that French criminal policy emphasises repressive elements over preventive ones. At the level of the National Police, this translates into deployment tactics that distance them from the populace and increase the militarisation of the police. Another dimension that should be mentioned is the lack of support from superiors and the judiciary, which was subjectively experienced on the part of the police; however, within the framework of this article, the issue of structural deficits had to be excluded.

Among the current terrorist threats, the recurrent confrontations and a policy that traditionally distances them from the populace, the tenuous approaches to citizen-friendly strategies have been concluded and repression remains in the foreground – this repressive policy signals both internationally and domestically (to its own population) a fortified and strong state which does not shrink from the threats. The tricolours are raised and the Marseillaise is sung at the police demonstrations, but they are far from national unity and solidarity. A rapprochement between the population and the police, which goes beyond short-term solidarity effects after attacks, does not seem to be in sight due to both political and social circumstances, as well as internal structures.

1 However, due to the risk of disciplinary procedures for participating in such events, presumably only a certain number of the “angry police officers” venture onto the streets.

2 An official source for this, such as a website, does not seem to exist at the time of writing (early February 2017); there are many articles in print and Internet media with the heading “Union des policiers nationaux indépendants” and “policiers en colère”.

3 In the National Police, not all officers – like for example in Germany – regardless of rank, have the same powers, but the
right to OPJ can be acquired through additional training or as part of officer training (high-level career service). This is important in French investigations, as only officers with this function have important powers under the French Code of Criminal Procedure, the other officers may only act on the instructions of this OPJ. 4 Currently, there are no official statistics. The “resignations” of this competence can be followed on social media, as there are many postings there on this subject. However, daily newspapers are also becoming aware of these problem areas. For example, “Le Parisien” reported on 30.01.2017 that 90% of the OPJ in the Val-de-Marne area had asked for their “competence” to be annulled.

5 Whether or not this criticism of the decision-making behaviour of the judiciary is justified cannot be answered in the context of this article.

6 This is an internal assessment for the École Nationale Supérieure de la Police, ENSP, responsible for the training of the upper and senior service grades.

7 5,000 additional posts were approved for the security forces (police and gendarmerie) combined after the attacks in November 2015. At the National Police alone, more than 35,000 applicants were admitted to the recruitment test. See Civique 2016.

8 See Jobard/de Maillard 2015.


11 See Kepel 2015; ibid 2016 on the emergence of Islamic terrorism.

12 See Kepel 2016 on the causes.

13 See Gabriel Montlheret in the online journal “Contrepoints”, 31.03.2016, online: www.contrepoints.org/2016/03/31/245057-letat-durgence-met-endanger-letat-de-droit, (09.01.2016).


16 In English: The sentinels.


20 There are no reliable figures.

21 Acronym for Police aux Frontières. Border protection is exclusively assigned to the National Police as an area of responsibility.

22 This concerns informal, subjective information; official reports are not available.

23 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.03.2016 (74). Politics section, 2.

24 See in essayistic form Lustiger (Lustiger 2016, 40 ff) on the French penchant for acronyms and their constant changes, for example of the attempt to designate urban problem areas in a politically correct way.


26 These findings are the result of discussions with senior police officers of the Strasbourg Police Directorate (Direction Départementale de la Sécurité Publique – DDSP 67).

27 See Jobard 2016a; ibid 2016b; Gauthier 2012; Lukas/Gauthier 2011; de Maillard et al. 2016 on control practice. Fundamental to deviance and police violence, Jobard/de Maillard 2015, 141 ff).

28 See L’Essor de la Gendarmerie Nationale 2015. Barometer on the standing of the National Police and the National Gendarmerie. 81 % of respondents to the ISOP Institute had a good opinion of the gendarmerie, 65 % had a good opinion of the National Police. This source was deliberately used here, as there are currently various polls that also give the police high values. However, these are negligible in the long-term view and suggest that these currently positive effects have come about due to the heroic operation in the context of the terrorist attacks.

29 Online: http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Interstats.

30 The strict organisational separation between the police and gendarmerie was the case in France until 2009, when the gendarmerie was still subordinate to the Ministry of Defence.

31 Hence, also without real regulation of working hours and trade union assistance.

32 “Brigade Anti-Commando” anti-commando brigades as part of the Brigades de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI); English: search and intervention brigades.

33 The origin is the report by a commission of mayors, chaired by Gilbert Bonnemaison on the organisation of security work – see Face à la délinquance: prévention, répression, solidarité; rapport au Premier Ministre – from 1983.
The author as a representative of the police headquarters in Offenburg belongs to this as a permanent member.

Repeatedly discussed as part of site visits to different CRS units by the authors of the article.

See here also Tränkle/Herzbach 2012b.

Sources of information


Gauthier, Jeremie (2012). Origines contrôlées. La police à l’épreuve de la question minoritaire à Paris et à Berlin, dissertation, Université de Versailles-Saint Quentin en Yvelines/Albert Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, online: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/77/86/49/PDF/these_J_Gauthier_red.pdf.


Further literature and links