TY - JOUR AB - There is a risk that tools to combat corruption may actually create more corruption. Calls for the widespread use of undercover methods in international corruption investigations ignore the significant risk of corruption and human rights violations with these techniques. Preoccupied primarily with crafting international legal instruments the United Nations and its Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) has gravely overlooked the singular human dimensions that shape the outcome of specialized investigations. First, investigators in specialized undercover projects often undergo dynamic changes in personality, ethical norms and behaviour in the course of plying their craft. Second, criminal intelligence will not be shared among foreign international police organizations if a reputation for an uneven application of professional standards exists, or if integrity and trust has not been established through prior personal contacts with foreign police officers. What are the hidden problems with specialized undercover investigations? How have agencies in non-European countries dealt with these problems over the years? We explore these questions and argue that the EU is in a unique position to develop instruments of self-regulation to manage the risks of corruption by investigators, and to promote trust and strengthen values with new EU partners. This could serve as a model for implementing some of the more contentious Articles of the UNCAC. AU - Girodo, Michel DO - 10.7396/2008_1_B ET - 3/2013 KW - Corruption international investigations techniques human rights violation Convention Against Corruption UNCAC undercover investigation EU L1 - http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_SIAK/4/2/1/2008/ausgabe_1/files/Girodo_1_2008.pdf LA - eng IS - 1 PY - 2008 SN - 1813-3495 SP - 13-19 ST - Specialized Corruption Investigations. Soft Law Controls T2 - SIAK-Journal − Zeitschrift für Polizeiwissenschaft und polizeiliche Praxis TI - Specialized Corruption Investigations. Soft Law Controls UR - http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_SIAK/4/2/1/2008/ausgabe_1/files/Girodo_1_2008.pdf VL - 5 ID - 291 ER -